Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem FMEA/CIL by Trahan, W. H. et al.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ASSESSMENT
OFTHE
GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION,
AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
23 JANUARY 1988
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900002468 2020-03-20T00:50:19+00:00Z

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY
HOUSTON DIVISION
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS SUPPORT
WORKING PAPER NO. 1.0-WP-VA88003-06
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ASSESSMENT OF THE GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
FMEA/CIL
23 JANUARY 1988
This Working Paper is Submitted to NASA under
Task Order No. VA88003, Contract NAS 9-17650
W.H. Trahan
Analyst
Independent Orbiter
Assessment
R.A. O'Donnell
Analyst
Independent Orbiter
Assessment
PREPARED BY:
K.C. Pietz /
Analyst
Independent Orbiter
Assessment
PREPARED BY: , x> _..'
_.JP'Drapela_
GNC Lead
Independent Orbiter
Assessment
 ,,ROV'O
A:J. Mar_no/
Section _anager-FMEA/CIL Technical Manager
Independent Orbiter Independent Orbiter
Assessment Assessment
APPROVED • '-I _'" _ :_
/_z. McPherson
_t Manager

CO_E_S
3.0
4.0
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
2.2 Scope
2.3 Analysis Approach
2.4 GNC Ground Rules and Assumptions
SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
3.3 Hierarchy
ASSESSMENT RESULTS
4.1 Assessment Results - GNC Major Components
4.2 Assessment Results - GNC Function Switches
and Circuits
4.3 Assessment Results - GNC Power Switches
and Circuits
5.0 REFERENCES
APPENDIX A ACRONYMS
APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
B.2 Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
B.3 Subsystem Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
APPENDIX C
APPENDIX D
APPENDIX E
APPENDIX F
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
CRITICAL ITEMS
ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE
Page
1
4
4
4
4
5
6
6
9
9
25
28
32
36
40
A-I
B-I
B-2
B-4
B-7
C-I
D-I
E-I
F-I
List of Figures
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
Flgure
Figure
1 - GNC FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
2 - GNC SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
3 - GNC ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER (RHC)
4 - GNC TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER (THC)
5 - GNC RUDDER PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (RPTA)
6 - GNC SPEED BRAKE THRUST CONTROLLER (SBTC)
7 - GNC INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT (IMU)
8 - GNC STAR TRACKER (ST)
Figure 9 - GNC CREW OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SITE (COAS)
Figure i0 - GNC AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (ADTA)
Figure ii - GNC ORBITER RATE GYRO ASSEMBLY (ORGA)
Figure 12 - GNC SRB RATE GYRO ASSEMBLY (SRGA)
Figure 13 - GNC ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY (AA)
Figure 14 - GNC AEROSURFACE SERVO AMPLIFIER (ASA)
Figure 15 - GNC REACTION JET DRIVER (RJD)
Figure 16 - GNC ASCENT THRUST VECTOR CONTROL (ATVC)
Page
2
i0
ii
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
List of Tables
II -
III -
IV -
V -
VI -
VII -
SUMMARY OF IOA FMEA ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY OF IOA CIL ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY OF IOARECOMMENDED FAILURE
CRITICALITIES
SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS
IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS
GNC MAJOR COMPONENTS - SUMMARY OF IOA
FMEA ASSESSMENT
GNC MAJOR COMPONENTS - SUMMARY OF IOA
CIL ASSESSMENT
VIII - GNC MAJOR COMPONENTS - SUMMARY OF IOA
RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES
IX - GNC MAJOR COMPONENTS - SUMMARY OF IOA
RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS
X - GNC FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - SUMMARY
OF IOA FMEA ASSESSMENT
XI - GNC FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - SUMMARY
OF IOA CIL ASSESSMENT
XII - GNC FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - SUMMARY
OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES
XIII - GNC FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - SUMMARY
OF IOA RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS
XIV - GNC POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - SUMMARY
OF IOA FMEA ASSESSMENT
XV - GNC POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - SUMMARY
OF IOA CIL ASSESSMENT
XVI - GNC POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - SUMMARY
OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES
XVII - GNC POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - SUMMARY
OF IOA RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS
Page
25
25
26
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
ii
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Guidance, Navigation, and
Control System FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 2_206. Instructions
_or PreDaration of FMEA and CIL. i0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Guidance,
Navigation, and Control System (GNC) hardware, generating draft
failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve
independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance
upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation.
The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline
with proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter GNC hardware.
The IOA product for the GNC analysis consisted of one-hundred
forty-one (141) failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in
twenty-four (24) potential critical items being identified.
Comparison was made to the NASA baseline (as of 4 January 1988)
which consisted of one-hundred forty-eight (148) FMEAs and
thirty-six (36) CIL items. The comparison determined if there
were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in
the NASA baseline. This comparison produced agreement on all but
fifty-six (56) FMEAs which caused differences in zero (0) CIL
items. Reference Figure 1.
The issues arose due to di$$ere_t Interpretation of NSTS 22206.
_MEA/CIL preparation instructions. IOA analyzed the components
of the electrical circuits, generating fifty-six (56) worksheets
more than NASA, who treated the electrical circuits as black
boxes. Of these fifty-six (56) differences with the FMEA's, all
were minor and did not affect criticalities assessments. In
conclusion, IOA is in full agreement with the revised NASA CIL
baseline.
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Figure la - GNC FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
1.1 Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL .
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The GNC ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B.
3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Funation
The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance,
navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle
control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC
software.
The functions of the GNC software can be divided into flight
control, guidance, navigation, hardware data processing, and crew
display. The specific tasks of each function, as well as the GNC
hardware used to support them, vary with mission phase.
Figure 2 is an overview of the GNC hardware for which failure
modes analysis was performed. For the analysis, the hardware was
divided into the following three categories:
Ie MAJOR COMPONENTS (BLACK BOXES) - This category includes
the sensors, manual controllers, and effector interfaces
listed below:
(I) RHC (8) ADTA
(2) THC (9) RGA (ORB)
(3) RPTA (i0) RGA (SRB)
(4) SBTC (Ii) AA
(5) IMU (12) ASA
(6) ST (13) RJD
(7) COAS (14) ATVC
Figures 3 - 16 provide a hardware breakdown of each of the
above components.
FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - This category consists of
switches/circuits whose primary purpose is to select a
particular mode of operation for the GNC software. Twelve
groups were identified and are listed below:
(i) TRIM ENABLE INHIBIT SW'S (8)
(2) TRIM SW'S (9)
(3) TRIM ON/OFF SW'S (i0)
(4) SENSE -Z/-X SW (ii)
(5) P,R/Y CSS/AUTO PBI'S (12)
(6) SPD BK/THROT PBI'S
(7) BODY FLAP CNTL CKT
ATT REF PBI
ENTRY MODE SW CKT
ABORT MODE CKT
DAP PBI 'S
FCS CHNL CNTL CKT
III. POWERSWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - This category consists of
groups of switches/circuits that provide electrical power
to the major components and Flight Control System (FCS)
annunciation lamps. Thirteen groups were identified and are
listed below:
(i) FLT CNTLR PWR CKT
(2) IMU PWR CKT
(3) ST PWR CKT
(4) ST DOOR PWR CKT
(5) COAS PWR CKT
(6) ADTA PWR CKT
(7) RGA (ORB) PWR CKT
(s)
(9)
(lo)
(lz)
(12)
(13)
RGA (SRB) PWR CKT
AA PWR CKT
ASA PWR CKT
RJD PWR CKT
ATVC PWR CKT
FCS SW ANNUN CKT
A brief description of the major components and function switches
and circuits is provided below.
i• Three RHC's, two forward and one aft, provide manual
attitude control•
• Two THC's, one at the CDR's station and one aft, provide
manual translation control with the use of the RCS system.
• Two RPTA's, one connected to the CDR's pedals and one to
the PLT's, send rudder and nose wheel steering commands to
the GPCs.
. Two SBTCs, one at the CDRs station and one at the PLTs,
control the speedbrake during entry. The pilot's SBTC can
also be used for main engine throttle control during
ascent.
1 Three IMU's, attached to the NAV base, provide acceleration
and attitude data to the GPC's.
• Two ST's, mounted on the NAY base, are used to align the
IMU's and to provide line of site vectors during rendezvous
missions.
e
o
One COAS that can be mounted at the CDR's station or the
aft station is a backup to the ST's for use in IMU
alignment.
Four ADTA's, located in the forward avionics bay, provides
pressure data to the GPC's. this data is used during entry
to calculate angle of attack, relative speed, mach number,
and barometric altitude.
. Four orbiter RGA's, mounted at the bottom of the aft
bulkhead, provide attitude rates about each body axis to
flight control for stability augmentation during ascent and
entry.The RGA's also drive the rate needles of the ADI's
during ascent.
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I0.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Four SRB RGA's, two on the left and two on the right SRB,
provide pitch and yaw rates to flight control to assist in
SRB TVC and to provide stability augmentation during ascent
until SRB separation.
Four AA's, located in the forward avionics bays, measure
normal and lateral body acceleration for use in flight
control to provide stability augmentation during ascent and
entry.
Four ASA's, located in the aft avionics bays, derive
aerosurface actuator position error commands and perform
fault detection.
Four RJD's, two forward and two aft, in response to flight
control commands, send signals to open/close the oxidizer
and fuel valves associated with each RCS jet.
Four ATVC's, located in the aft avionics bays, provide SRB
and main engine gimbal control for slewing engine bells
prior to liftoff, gimbaling engines to control trajectory
during flight, positioning the main engines to a dump
position, and stow position.
Two TRIM ENABLE/INHIBIT switches, CDR's and PLT's, allow
the software to accept or reject trim commands from the
panel trim switches and the RHC trim switches.
Six TRIM switches, a roll, pitch, yaw set at the CDR's and
PLT's station, allow the crew to make small changes in the
vehicles attitude via commands to the aerosurfaces.
Two panel TRIM ON/OFF switches, CDR's and PLT's, provide
power to the associated TRIM switches when in the "ON"
position.
One SENSE -Z/-X switch located on the aft panel A6, is used
onorbit to make the aft RHC, THC, and ADI correspond to the
operator's line of sight.
Two sets of PITCH, ROLL/YAW CSS/AUTO PBI's exist (eight
switches total) that allow the CDR or PLT to select auto or
manual (CSS) attitude control during ascent and entry.
TWo SPD BK/THROT PBI's, CDR's and PLT's station, allow the
crew to switch to auto from manual throttle control during
ascent and to auto or manual speed brake control during
entry.
The BODY FLAP CONTROL CIRCUIT consists of two BODY FLAP
UP/DOWN switches and two BODY FLAP AUTO/MANUAL PBI's that
allow manual or auto control from either the CDR's or PLT's
station.
22. Three ATT REF PBI's, located at the CDR's, PLT's, and aft
crew stations, allow the crew to select a reference frame
from which attitude errors will be displayed on the three
Attitude Direction Indicators (ADI). The ATT REF PBI is
also used to take "marks" when the COAS is used for IMU
alignment.
23. The ENTRY MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT provides capability for the
crew to change DAP control modes during entry via the ENTRY
MODE switch.
24. The ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT provides capability for the
crew to select and initiate an abort mode during ascent via
the ABORT MODE ROTARY switch and the ABORT push button.
25. Forty eight DAP PBI's (24 fwd and 24 aft) provide crew
flexibility in selecting translational and rotational
control options with the ONORBIT and TRANS DAPS.
26. Four FCS CHANNEL CONTROL CIRCUITS provide power and control
to one of four ASA's and ATVC's via the four FCS CHANNEL
OVERRIDE/AUTO/OFF switches on panel C3.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The GNC hardware is located throughout the orbiter. The precise
location for each component/switch/circuit was provided on the
analysis worksheets in Working Paper No. 1.0-WP-VA86001-16.
The GNC hardware is interfaced with the software via the flight
critical MDM's. Switch and power status is monitored via the
flight critical MDM's and operational instrumentation.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the breakdown of the GNC into it's hardware
components, and Figures 3 through 16 are the detailed systems
representations.
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Figure 2 - GNC SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Fig_Ee 3 - GNC ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER (RHC)
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Figure 4 - GNC TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER (THC}
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FiguEe 5 - GNC RUDDER PEDAL TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (RPTA)
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Figure 6 - GNC SPEED BRAKE THRU6T CONTROLLER (SBTC)
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Figure 7 - GNC INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT (IMU)
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Figure 8 - GNC STAR TRACKER (ST)
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FiguEe 9 - GNC CREW OPTICAL ALIGNMENT SITE (COAS)
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Figure I0 - GNC AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (ADTA)
18
>-
m
O
Z
m
o
_°
0_
-°___ 0 uJ
O.Z
_,=,.
_,=.
em_E
m
r_
Figure ii - GNC ORBITER RATE GYRO ASSEMBLY (ORGA)
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Figure 13 - GNC ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY (AA)
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Figure 14 - GNC AEROSURFACE SERVO AMPLIFIER (ASA)
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Figure 16 - GNC ASCENT THRUST VECTOR CONTROL (ATVC)
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the GNC hardware initially generated one-
hundred forty-one (141) failure mode worksheets and identified
twenty-four (24) Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting
the assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison,
thirty-four (34) additional failure mode analysis worksheets were
generated. These analysis results were compared to the proposed
NASA Post 51-L baseline of one-hundred forty-eight (148) FMEAs
and thirty-six (36) CIL items, which were generated using the
NSTS-22206 FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon completion of the
assessment, one-hundred forty-three (143) of the one-hundred
forty-eight (148) FMEAs were in agreement. Of the five (5) that
remained, two (2) had minor discrepancies that did not affect
criticality. Of the remaining three (3), the issues were with
FMEAs 05-1-SRB-2, 05-60-6N0804-I, 2. In summary, no drawings
were available to assess the above EPD&C FMEAs.
The GNC assessment was divided into the following three
categories:
I. MAJOR COMPONENTS (BLACK BOXES)
II. FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - primary purpose is to
select a particular mode of operation for the GNC software.
III. POWER SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS - these provide electrical power
to the GNC major components and DAP annunciation lamps.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment I
Component 1 NASA I IOA 1 Issues 1
ALL l 148 1 175 1 56 i
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
Table II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment I
+ ! _ +
Component I NASA I IOA I Issues I
+ _ i
ALL 1 36 J 36 1 0 1
+ _ _.............. +
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Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the GNC subsystem for the Post 51-L FMEA
baseline.
Table III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality:
Number
1/1
8
2/IR
16 3/IR I 3/2R I 3/386 22 32
TOTAL
175
Table IV presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the GNC subsystem for the Post 51-L baseline.
+
Table IV Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
Criticality:
Number 3/IR12 3/2RI0 3/30
TOTAL
36
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed.
Appendix D highlights the NASA Critical Items and corresponding
IOA worksheet ID.
Appendix E contains new IOA analysis worksheets that cover
failure modes that were not included in the original analysis.
These worksheets were added in order to make a comparison with
the NASA FMEAs on these failure modes.
Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
+
I Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers I
I Component IOA ID Number I
4
I. RHC
2. FLT CNTLR PWR CKT
3. TRIM ENABLE INHIBIT SW'S
4. TRIM SW' S
5. TRIM ON/OFF SW' S
6. SENSE -Z/-X SW
7. P, R/Y CSS/AUTO PBI 'S
8. THC
9. RPTA
i0 SBTC
ii SPD BK/THROT PBI
12 IMU
13 IMU PWR CKT
14 ST
15 ST PWR CKT
16. COAS
17. COAS PWR CKT
18. ADTA
19. ADTA PWR CKT
20. RGA (ORB)
21. RGA (ORB) PWR CKT
22. RGA (SRB)
23. RGA (SRB) PWR CKT
24. AA
25. AA PWR CKT
26. ASA
27. FCS CHNL CNTL CKT
28. ASA PWR CKT
29. RJD
30. RJD PWR CKT
31. ATVC
32. ATVC PWR CKT
33. BODY FLAP CNTL CKT
34. DAP PBI 'S
35. FCS SW ANNUN CKT
36. ENTRY MODE SW
37. ABORT MODE CKT
38. ATT REF PB
39. MEASUREMENT ISO RESISTORS
GNC-101 to 105
GNC-II0 to iii
GNC-120 to 121
GNC-130 to 131
GNC-140 to 141
GNC-150 to 151
GNC-160 to 161
GNC-201 to 203
GNC-301 to 304
GNC-401 to 406
GNC-410 to 411
GNC-501 to 502
GNC-510 to 512
GNC-601 to 604
GNC-610 to 612
GNC-701 to 703
GNC-710 to 712
GNC-801 to 802
GNC-810 to 812
GNC-9OI to 902
GNC-903 to 905
GNC-950 to 951
GNC-960 to 961
GNC-1001 to 1002
GNC-1010 to 1014
GNC-II01 to 1108
GNC-III0 to 1112
GNC-II30 to 1131
GNC-1201 to 1208
GNC-1211 to 1214
GNC-1301 to 1305
GNC-1310 to 1311
GNC-1400 to 1404
GNC-1501 to 1586
GNC-1590 to 1593
GNC-1601 to 1602
GNC-1801 to 1804
GNC-1901 to 1902
GNC-1950
The three GNC categories are discussed in the following sections
along with issues, and the IOA recommendation for the Post 51-L
FMEA/CIL.
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4.1 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - GNC MAJOR COMPONENTS
Fourteen components were included in this category. A summary of
the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed for the GNC major components,
versus the recommended baseline, and any issues identified is
presented in Table VI.
4 +
I Table VI GNC Major Components ISummary of IOA FMEA Assessment
4 +
] Component NASA IOA Issues I
4 +
I. RHC
2. THC
3. RPTA
4. SBTC
5. IMU
6. ST
7. COAS
8. ADTA
9. RGA (ORB)
3
3
3
4
2
4
2
2
2
5
3
4
6
2
5
3
2
2
I0. RGA (SRB)
II. AA
12. ASA
13. RJD
14. ATVC
2
2
2
4
2
2
6
2
6
4
2
0
1
2
0
1
1
0
0
0
4
0
2
2
TOTAL 37 52 15
The issues resulted from IOA analyzing failure modes not covered
by NASA. These failures did not raise the criticality of the
component. NASA should consider generating FMEA's for
completeness.
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed for the GNC
major components, versus the recommended IOA baseline, and any
issues identified is presented in Table VII.
I Table VII GNC Major Components ISummary of IOA CIL Assessment
I Component NASA IOA Issues I
i. RHC
2. THC
3. RPTA
4. SBTC
5. IMU
6. ST
7. COAS
8. ADTA
9. RGA (ORB)
1
1
1
2
2
0
0
0
1
10. RGA (SRB)
Ii. AA
12. ASA
13. RJD
14. ATVC
TOTAL 15 15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table VIII presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the GNCmajor components for the Post 51-L FMEA
baseline.
TABLE VIII GNCMajor Components
Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality:
I. RHC
2. THC
3. RPTA
4. SBTC
5. IMU
6. ST
7. COAS
8. ADTA
9. RGA (ORB)
i0. RGA (SRB)
ii. AA
12. ASA
13. RJD
14. ATVC
TOTAL
i/I 2/IR
1
- 1
1
- 2
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
- 1
2 1
- 1
4 i0 0
3/IR
2
2
3
4
1
5
3
2
1
1
1
5
3
3
36
3/2R
m
0
3/3
2
D
2
TOTAL
5
3
4
6
2
5
3
2
2
2
2
6
6
4
52
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Table IX presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the GNC major components for the Post 51-L baseline.
TABLE IX GNC Major Components
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
Criticality:
i. RHC
2. THC
3. RPTA
4. SBTC
5. IMU
6. ST
7. COAS
8. ADTA
9. RGA (ORB)
I0. RGA (SRB)
ii. AA
12. ASA
13. RJD
14. ATVC
TOTAL
i/I
1
a
1
2
I
4
2/IR
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
i0
2/2 3/IR
1
1
3/2R
0
3/3 TOTAL
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
0 15
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4.2 ASSESSMENT RESULTS - GNC FUNCTION SWITCHES AND CIRCUITS
Twelve groups of switches and circuits make up this category. A
summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed for the GNC
function switches and circuits, versus the recommended baseline,
and any issues identified is presented in Table X.
4 +
I Table X GNC Function Switches and Circuits ISummary of IOA FMEA Assessment I
4
I Component NASA IOA Issues I
4 _
I. TRIM ENABLE
INHIB SW' S
2. TRIM SW'S
3. TRIM ON/OFF
SW'S
4. SENSE-Z/-X
SW
5. P,R/Y CSS/
AUTO PBI 'S
6. SPD BK/THROT
PBI
7. BODY FLAP
CNTL CKT
8. ATT REF PBI
9. ENTRY MODE
SW
i0. ABORT MODE
CKT
ii. DAP PBI'S
12. FCS CHNL
CNTL CKT
TOTAL
8
2
3
0
1
5
34
5
64
6
2
12
2
2
8
33
5
83
1
4
1
3
2
1
1
0
21
+ +
The issues resulted from IOA analyzing failure modes not covered
by NASA. These failures did not raise the criticality of the
component. NASA should consider generating FMEA's for
completeness. The DAP PBI's issues are the results of the
wording in the effects field.
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed for the GNC
function switches and circuits, versus the recommended IOA
baseline, and any issues identified is presented in Table XI.
I Table XI GNC Function Switches and Circuits ISummary of IOA CIL Assessment
4
I Component NASA IOA Issues I
i. TRIM ENABLE
INHIB SW' S
2. TRIM SW'S
3. TRIM ON/OFF
SW'S
4. SENSE-Z/-X
SW
5. P,R/Y CSS/
AUTO PBI 'S
6. SPD BK/THROT
PBI
7. BODY FLAP
CNTL CKT
8. ATT REF PBI
9. ENTRY MODE
SW
I0. ABORT MODE
CKT
ii. DAP PBI'S
12. FCS CHNL
CNTL CKT
TOTAL
0
0
3
4
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
33
Table XII presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the GNC function switches and circuits for the
Post 51-L FMEA baseline.
TABLE XII GNC Function Switches and Circuits
Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality:
i. TRIM ENABLE
INHIB SW' S
2. TRIM SW'S
3. TRIM ON/OFF
SW' S
4. SENSE -Z/-X
SW
5. R,P/Y CSS/
AUTO PBI' S
6. SPD BK/THROT
PBI
7. BODY FLAP
CNTL CKT
8. ATT REF PBI
9. ENTRY MODE
SW
i0. ABORT MODE
CKT
Ii. DAP PBI'S
12. FCS CHNL
CNTL CKT
2/2i/i 2/1R
m
i0
I
l0
3/IR
i0
6
2
I
5
m
3
3/2R
22
o
22
3/3
2
2
1
2
Qomml
2O
TOTAL
2
12
2
2
8
33
5
83
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Table XIII presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the GNC function switches and circuits for the Post 51-L baseline.
TABLE XIII GNC Function Switches and Circuits
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
Criticality:
1. TRIM ENABLE
INHIB SW' S
2. TRIM SW'S
3. TRIM ON/OFF
SW'S
4. SENSE-Z/-X
SW
5. R,P/Y CSS/
AUTO PBI 'S
6. SPD BK/THROT
PBI
7. BODY FLAP
CNTL CKT
8. ATT REF PBI
9. ENTRY MODE
SW
i0. ABORT MODE
CKT
ii. DAP PBI'S
12. FCS CHNL
CNTL CKT
TOTAL
1
3
2/IR
m
2
4
4
3/IR
w
3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
0
0
0
4
0
9
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4.3 ASSESSMENTRESULTS- GNCPOWERSWITCHESAND CIRCUITS
Twelve groups of switches and circuits make up this category. A
summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed for the GNCpower
switches and circuits, versus the recommended baseline, and any
issues identified is presented in Table XIV.
Table XIV GNC Power Switches and Circuits ISummary of IOA FMEA Assessment I
+ .I
I Component NASA IOA Issues I
+
i. FLT CNTLR
PWR CKT
2. IMU PWR CKT
3. ST PWR CKT
4. COAS PWR CKT
5. ADTA PWR CKT
6. RGA (ORB)
PWR CKT
7. AA PWR CKT
8. ASA PWR CKT
9. RJD PWR CKT
i0. ATVC PWR
CKT
ii. FCS SW
ANNUN CKT
12. RGA (SRB)
PWR CKT
TOTAL
4
6
1
1
2
5
7
48
3
3
2
1
3
4
40
0
0
2
4
0
0
0
8
Issues resulted from Interpretation of NSTS 22206, Instruction
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. IOA treated the circuitry as
black boxes, and NASA evaluated the components of the black
boxes. The RJD PWR CKT was not covered by NASA. However, the
failures covered by IOA did not raise the criticality of the
component.
36
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed for the GNC
power switches and circuits, versus the recommended IOA baseline,
and any issues identified is presented in Table XV.
I Table XV
I Component
GNC Power switches and Circuits I
Summary of IOA CIL Assessment I
1. FLT CNTLR
PWR CKT
2. IMU PWR CKT
3. ST PWR CKT
4. COAS PWR CKT
5. ADTA PWR CKT
6. RGA (ORB)
PWR CKT
7. AA PWR CKT
8. ASA PWR CKT
9. RJD PWR CKT
I0. ATVC PWR
CKT
Ii. FCS SW
ANNUN CKT
12. RGA (SRB)
PWR CKT
TOTAL
NASA IOA Issues
2
1
0
0
0
1
1
3
0
3
0
1
12
1
0
0
0
1
1
3
0
3
0
1
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
+
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Table XVI presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the GNC power switches and circuits for the
Post 51-L FMEA baseline.
TABLE XVI GNC Power Switches and Circuits
Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality:
I. FLT CNTLR
PWR CKT
2. IMU PWR CKT
3. ST PWR CKT
4. COAS PWR CKT
5. ADTA PWR CKT
6. RGA (ORB)
PWR CKT
7. AA PWR CKT
8. ASA PWR CKT
9. RJD PWR CKT
i0. ATVC PWR
CKT
ii. FCS SW
ANNUN CKT
12. RGA (SRB)
PWR CKT
TOTAL
2/IR
1
m
1
2
2/2
!
,n
3/IR
1
2
2
1
1
4
5
1
2
5
1
28
3/2R 3/3
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
l0
TOTAL
3
3
2
1
3
4
7
2
4
7
1
4O
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Table XVII presents a summary of the IOA recommended CIL items for
the GNCpower switches and circuits for the Post 51-L baseline.
TABLE XVII GNC Power Switches and Circuits
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
Critical ity:
i. FLT CNTLR
PWR CKT
2. IMU PWR CKT
3. ST PWR CKT
4. COAS PWR CKT
5. ADTA PWR CKT
6. RGA (ORB)
PWR CKT
7. AA PWR CKT
8. ASA PWR CKT
9. RJD PWR CKT
i0. ATVC PWR
CKT
ii. FCS SW
ANNUN CKT
12. RGA (SRB)
PWR CKT
TOTAL
2/IR
1
1
1
3 1
3/IR
u
1
1
i
2
D
2
1
8
3/2R TOTAL
2
1
1
1
3
3
1
12
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ACA -
A/D -
ADI -
ADTA -
AID -
ALC -
AOA -
APC -
ASA -
ATO -
ATVC -
BF
BFS -
BITE -
CB
CIL -
CKT -
CNTLR -
COAS -
CRIT -
CRT -
CSS -
C&W -
DAP -
DDU -
DEU -
DISC -
DPS -
DU
EIU -
EVA -
FA
FCOS -
FCS -
FDIR -
FF
FM
FMEA -
FSM -
FSSR -
FSW -
FUNC -
GPC -
GSE -
H/W -
IMU -
IOA -
APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
Accelerometer Assembly
Annunciator Control Assembly
Analog to Digital
Attitude Direction Indicator
Air Data Transducer Assembly
Analog Input Differential
Aft Load Controller
Abort Once Around
Aft Power Controller
Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
Abort To Orbit
Ascent Thrust Vector Control
Body Flap
Backup Flight System
Built-In Test Equipment
Circuit Breaker
Critical Items List
Circuit
Controller
Crew Optical Alignment Sight
Criticality
Cathode Ray Tube
Control Stick Steering
Caution and Warning System
Digital Auto Pilot
Display Driver Unit
Display Electronics Unit
Discrete
Data Processing System
Display Unit
Engine Interface Unit
Extra Vehicular Activity
Flight Aft
Flight Control Operating System
Flight Control System
Fault Detection, Identification, Reconfiguration
Flight Forward
Failure Mode
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Fault Summary Message
Functional Subsystem Software Requirements
Flight Software
Function
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
Hardware
Inertial Measurement Unit
Independent Orbiter Assessment
A-I
LF
LL
LPS
LR
LRU -
MAN -
MC
MCC -
MCDS -
MDAC -
MDM -
MEC -
MM
MSK -
MVS
NA
NASA -
NORM -
NSTS -
OA
OF
OMRSD -
OMS -
OPS -
p
PBI -
PCI -
PCM -
POS -
R
RCS -
RGA -
RHC -
RI
RJD -
RM
ROT -
RPC -
RPTA -
RS
RTLS -
SBTC -
SF
SM
SOP -
SRB -
SSME -
ST
STS -
SW
SlW -
Launch Forward
Launch Left
Launch Processing System
Launch Right
Line Replaceable Unit
Manual
Memory Configuration
Mission Control Center
Multifunction CRT Display System
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Main Engine Controller
Major Mode
Manual Select Keyboard
Mid Value Select
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Normal
National Space Transportation System
Operational Aft
Operational Forward
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Operational Sequence
Pitch
Pushbutton Indicator
Potential Critical Item
Pulse Code Modulation
Position
Roll
Reaction Control System
Rate Gyro Assembly
Rotational Hand Controller
Rockwell International
Reaction Jet Driver
Redundancy Management
Rotation
Remote Power Controller
Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
Redundant Set
Return To Landing Site
Speed Brake Thrust Controller
Selection Filter
Systems Management
Subsystem Operating Program
Solid Rocket Booster
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Star Tracker
Space Transportation System
Switch
Software
A-2
TAL -
TD
THC -
TRANS -
TVC -
VDC -
VERN -
y
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Touch Down
Translational Hand Controller
Translation
Thrust Vector Control
Volts Direct Current
Vernier
Yaw
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions For preparation
of FMEA/CIL. i00Gtobe_ 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITy - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE {MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MUDTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OF_-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARy M_SSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
_IFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORB_T PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFTNITION8 • GROUND RULE8 • AND ASSUMPTION8
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
I•
•
•
•
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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.o
•
.
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysiswas substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND I%SSUMPTION8
GNC - Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The failure analyses will be conducted to the black box
level for components whose output serves only one function
unless a lower level is required to be consistent with the
existing FMEAs.
RATIONALE: The definition credible failure modes are
oriented toward the black box functional
output.
For black boxes whose output serves more than one function,
the analysis will go to a level that effects each of the
different functions•
RATIONALE: The defined credible failure modes are
oriented toward the black box functional
output.
Credible failure modes for most black boxes are defined to
be
(1) No output
(2) Erroneous output (Output that redundancy management
will detect as a failure.)
(3) Premature output (Output occurs without command. This
may not be credible for all black boxes.)
RATIONALE: Covers worst case effects on function.
Credible failures for switches are defined to be
(i) Fails on (Power cannot be shut off by switch.)
(2) Fails off (Power cannot be turned on.)
(3) Short to ground
(4) Internal short (Short across switch contacts.)
RATIONALE: Covers worst case effects on function.
Power circuits analysis does not include the resistors that
reside between the power circuit and a MDM.
RATIONALE: These resistors provide signal conditioning
for the MDM and are not a part of the power
circuit.
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_PPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the Assessment of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control
Subsystem. The information on these worksheets facilitates the
comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL (Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA
detailed analysis worksheets included in Appendix E. Each of
these worksheets identifies the NASA FMEAbeing assessed,
corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet ID (Appendix E), hardware
item, criticality, redundancy screens, and recommendations. For
each failure mode, the highest assessed hardware and functional
criticality is compared and discrepancies noted as "N" in the
compare row under the column where the discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-101
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3042-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: I01
ITEM: RHC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OF CNTL STICK.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL JAMMING.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE AS SHOWN
IN THE NASA-JSC FMEA REVIEW COMMENTS. IF AN RHC SHOULD JAM
DURING THE CRITICAL ENTRY FLIGHT PHASE OF FINAL FLARE AND LANDING
APPROACH MANEUVERS, LOSS OF CONTROL COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
IOA DOES NOT RECOMMEND A CHANGE TO THE REVISED NASA FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-102
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3042-2
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 102
ITEM: RHC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO XDCR OUTPUT ON A CMD CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF A CHN-TRANSDUCER OR SWITCH.
NO DIFFERENCES.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-103
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3042-3
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 103
ITEM: RHC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS XDCR OUTPUT ON A CMD CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-TRANSDUCER OR SWITCH.
NO DIFFERENCES.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-104
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3042-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 104
ITEM: RHC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT ON A TRIM SW CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF A CHN-TRANSDUCER OR SWITCH.
THE NASA FMEA COVERS TWO FAILURES WHICH INCLUDES THIS IOA FAILURE
MODE. SINCE THIS FAILURE MODE IS OF LOWER CRITICALITY THAN THE
OTHER NASA FAILURE MODE, IOA DOES NOT RECOMMEND THAT A NEW FMEA
BE WRITTEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-105
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3042-3
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 105
ITEM: RHC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C P ] C P ]
[ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: TRIM SW CHN FAILS ON.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-TRANSDUCER OR SWITCH.
THE NASA FMEA COVERS TWO FAILURES WHICH INCLUDES THIS IOA FAILURE
MODE. SINCE THIS FAILURE MODE IS OF LOWER CRITICALITY THAN THE
OTHER NASA FAILURE MODE, IOA DOES NOT RECOMMEND THAT A NEW FMEA
BE WRITTEN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II0
NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2203-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
Ii0
CIRCUIT-FLT CNTLR PWR
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ HA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CB OR SW FAILS CLOSED. FMEA FAILURE MODE: SW
FLs CLOSED IN "ON" POSITION. NO DIFFERENCES. IF SWITCH FAILS ON,
THE FLIGHT CONTROLLER POWER CAN BE TURNED OFF BY THE ASSOCIATED
DDU CIRCUIT BREAKERS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-III
NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2103-I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
iii
CIRCUIT-FLT CNTLR PWR
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CB OR SW FAILS OPEN, OR SHORTED TO GROUND,
FMEA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT BREAKIER-LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPENS.
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE REVISED FMEA. ONE
REDUNDANT CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB) FL OPEN IS NOT DETECTABLE. TWO
CBs FL OPEN ARE NOT DETECTABLE, BUT THE RESULTING LOSS OF THE DDU
POWER SUPPLIES (A,B,C) ARE DETECTABLE. SINCE CB FL CLOSE IS A
3/3, AND DOES NOT UPGRADE OPEN FAIL MODE 3/IR, IOA DOES
NOT RECOMMEND A NEW FMEA FOR THE CLOSE FL MODE. THE CIL WAS NOT
AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATION OF THE RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-IIIA
NASA FMEA #: 05-6Q-2203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
iii
CIRCUIT-FLT CNTLR PWR
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODE: CB OR SW FAILS OPEN, OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SW FLs CLOSED IN "OFF" POSITION, SHORT TO
GROUND AT "ON" POSITION CONTACTS, POLE-TO-POLE SHORT. IOA
INITIALLY CONSIDERED THE SWITCH CONTACT FAIL OPEN MODE, WHICH
PROVIDED THE CRITICALITY OF 3/IR. AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF
FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES
CONCUR WITH THE REVISED FMEA CRITICALITY OF 2/IR FOR THE SWITCH
FAILURE MODES. THE LEFT AND RIGHT FLT CNTRL SWs FAILED IN
THE OFF POSITION RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE PLT'S AND CDR'S
FLIGHT CONTROLLERS AND PROBABLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL. THE CIL
WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATION OF THE RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-IIIB
NASA FMEA # : 05-6Q-2203- (TBD) PREL
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
111
CIRCUIT-FLT CNTLR PWR
LEAD ANALYST : ROBERT 0 'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
C ]
COSPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CB OR SW FAILS OPEN, OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: AFT PWR CNTLR SW FAILED CLOSED IN "OFF"
POSITION, SHORT TO GROUND AT "ON" POSITION CONTACTS, POLE-TO-POLE
SHORT.
NASA AND IOA INITIALLY CONSIDERED THE LEFT, RIGHT, AND AFT
SWITCHES AS A GROUP WITH FAILURE OFF (OPEN) MODE OF CRIT 3/IR.
AFTER FURTHER EVALUATION OF SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR
WITH THE NEW FMEA FAIL OFF (OPEN) MODE FOR AFT FLT CNTLR PWR SW.
THE LOSS OF THE AFT FLT CNTLR'S (RHC/THC) WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT
TO PERFORM MISSIONS REQUIRING RENDEZVOUS AND PROX OPS. THE CIL
WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATION OF THE RETENTION RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-120
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7241-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
120
SWITCH-TRIM ENABLE/INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED (INHIBIT POSITION).
FME FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-121
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7241-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
GNC
121
SWITCH-TRIM ENABLE/INHIBIT
ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SW CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS OPEN
OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-130
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7254-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 130
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES-ROLL TRIM.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-130A
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7255-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 130
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES-PITCH TRIM.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-130B
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7256-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 130
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ]
o
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES-YAW TRIM.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-131
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7254-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 131
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SW CONTACT FAILS OPEN, OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES-ROLL TRIM.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-131A
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7255-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 131
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SW CONTACT FAILS OPEN, OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES-PITCH TRIM.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-131B
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7256-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 131
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SW CONTACT FAILS OPEN, OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES-YAW TRIM.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-140
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7242-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 140
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM ON/OFF
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-141
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7242-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 141
ITEM: SWITCH-TRIM ON/OFF
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SW CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS OPEN
OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-150
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7262-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 150
ITEM: SWITCH-SENSE
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-151
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7262-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 151
ITEM: SWITCH-SENSE
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SW CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS OPEN
OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
GNC-160
05-I-FC7245-0001
GNC
160
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
ROBERT O'DONNELL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED. FMEA FAILURE
MODE: PITCH AUTO PBI SW FAILS TO TRANSFER. FOR AUTO PBI FAILED
ON (PBI FAILED TO TRANSFER OR JAMMED), THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY
IS i/i.
IF AUTO PBI SW FAILS ON, THE CREW WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEPRESS AND
HOLD CSS PBI FOR MANUAL CONTROL. IN ORBIT (OPS 2/8), THE SWITCH
CAN BE DESELECTED FROM REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT. NO AUTOLAND
CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME. THIS FAILURE WILL CAUSE A CHANGE
IN OPERATING PROCEDURES AND WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN
WORKLOAD.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-160A
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7246-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
160
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED. FMEA FAILURE
MODE: PITCH CSS PBI SW FAILS TO TRANSFER. IF CSS PBI FAILS ON,
THERE IS NO MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY. WHEN IN ORBIT (OPS 2/8),
THE SWITCH CAN BE DESELECTED FROM REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT. THE
MISSION CAN BE COMPLETED IN THE MANUAL CSS MODE FOR ENTRY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-160B
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7248-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
160
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT :
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED. FMEA FAILURE
MODE: ROLL/YAW AUTO PBI SW FAILS TO TRANSFER. FOR AUTO PBI
FAILED ON (PBI FAILED TO TRANSFER OR JAMMED), THE WORST CASE
CRITICALITY IS I/I.
IF AUTO PBI SW FAILS ON, THE CREW WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEPRESS AND
HOLD CSS PBI FOR MANUAL CONTROL. IN ORBIT (OPS 2/8), THE SWITCH
CAN BE DESELECTED FROM REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT. NO AUTOLAND
CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME. THIS FAILURE WILL CAUSE A CHANGE
IN OPERATING PROCEDURES AND WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN
WORKLOAD.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-160C
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7249-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
GNC
160
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT :
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED. FMEA FAILURE
MODE: ROLL/YAW CSS PBI SW FAILS TO TRANSFER. IF CSS PBI FAILS
ON, THERE IS NO MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY. WHEN IN ORBIT (OPS
2/8), THE SWITCH CAN BE DESELECTED FROM REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT.
THE MISSION CAN BE COMPLETED IN THE MANUAL CSS MODE FOR ENTRY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-160D
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7245-0002
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
160
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED. FMEA FAILURE
MODE: PITCH AUTO PBI SW CONTACT-INTERNAL SHORT.
THE SW CONTACT FAILURES ARE HANDLED BY THE STANDARD 3 CONTACT SW
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT (RM). SW RM DESELECTS FIRST FAILED CONTACT
AND REQUIRES THE "AND" OF TWO CONTACTS FOR AN OUTPUT. IF AUTO
PBI SW FLs ON, THE CREW WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEPRESS AND
HOLD CSS PBI FOR MANUAL CNTL. IN ORBIT (OPS 2/8), THE SW CAN BE
DESELECTED FROM RM. NO AUTOLAND CONSIDERED. THIS FAILURE WILL
CAUSE A CHANGE IN OPERATING PROCEDURES AND INCREASE IN WORKLOAD.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-160E
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7246-0002
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
160
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED. FMEA FAILURE
MODE: PITCH CSS PBI SW CONTACT-INTERNAL SHORT.
THE SW CONTACT FAILURES ARE HANDLED BY THE STANDARD 3 CONTACT SW
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT (RM). SW RM DESELECTS FIRST FAILED CONTACT
AND REQUIRES THE "AND" OF TWO CONTACTS FOR AN OUTPUT. IF CSS PBI
FAILS ON, THERE IS NO MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY.
WHEN IN ORBIT (OPS 2/8), THE SWITCH CAN BE DESELECTED FROM RM.
THE MISSION CAN BE COMPLETED IN THE MANUAL CSS MODE FOR ENTRY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:I/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-160F
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7248-0002
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
160
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ROBERT O'DONNELL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_T_)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED. FMEA FAILURE
MODE: ROLL/YAW AUTO PBI SW CONT-INTERNAL SHORT.
THE SW CONTACT FAILURES ARE HANDLED BY THE STANDARD 3 CONTACT SW
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT (RM). SW RM DESELECTS FIRST FAILED CONTACT
AND REQUIRES THE "AND" OF TWO CONTACTS FOR AN OUTPUT. IF AUTO
PBI SW FLS ON, THE CREW WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEPRESS AND
HOLD CSS PBI FOR MANUAL CNTL. IN ORBIT (OPS 2/8), THE SW CAN BE
DESELECTED FROM RM. NO AUTOLAND CONSIDERED. THIS FAILURE WILL
CAUSE A CHANGE IN OPERATING PROCEDURE AND INCREASE IN WORKLOAD.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-160G
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7249-0002
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
GNC
160
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED. FMEA FAILURE
MODE: ROLL/YAW CSS PBI SW CONT-INTERNAL SHORT.
THE SW CONTACT FAILURES ARE HANDLED BY THE STANDARD 3 CONTACT SW
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT (RM). SW RM DESELECTS FIRST FAILED CONTACT
AND REQUIRES THE "AND" OF TWO CONTACTS FOR AN OUTPUT. IF CSS PBI
FAILS ON, THERE IS NO MANUAL OVERRIDE CAPABILITY.
WHEN IN ORBIT (OPS 2/8), THE SWITCH CAN BE DESELECTED FROM RM.
THE MISSION CAN BE COMPLETED IN THE MANUAL CSS MODE FOR ENTRY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-161
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7245-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
161
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS OPEN. FMEA FAILURE MODE:
PITCH AUTO PBI SW FAILS TO TRANSFER.
IF AUTO PBI FAILS OFF, THE OTHER CREW POSITION CAN BE USED. FCS
IS INITIALIZED IN AUTO DURING ASCENT. IF NECESSARY, CSS CAN BE
FLOWN DURING ASCENT. CSS MANUAL MODE CAN BE FLOWN DURING ALL
ENTRY PHASES. NO AUTOLAND IS CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-161A
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7246-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
161
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS OPEN. FMEA FAILURE MODE:
PITCH CSS PBI SW FAILS TO TRANSFER.
IF CSS PBI SW FAILS OFF, USE THE OTHER CREW POSITION OR PLACE THE
RHC OUT-OF-DETENT FOR MANUAL FCS CONTROL. NO AUTOLAND IS
CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-161B
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7248-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
161
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O 'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS OPEN. FMEA FAILURE MODE:
ROLL/YAW AUTO PBI SW FAILS TO TRANSFER.
IF AUTO PBI FAILS OFF, THE OTHER CREW POSITION CAN BE USED. FCS
IS INITIALIZED IN AUTO DURING ASCENT. CSS MANUAL MODE CAN BE
FLOWN DURING ALL ENTRY PHASES. NO AUTOLAND IS CONSIDERED AT THIS
TIME.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-161C
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7249-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
GNC
161
SWITCH- P, R/Y, CSS/AUTO
ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS OPEN. FMEA FAILURE MODE:
ROLL/YAW CSS PBI SW FAILS TO TRANSFER.
IF CSS PBI SW FAILS OFF, USE THE OTHER CREW POSITION OR PLACE THE
RHC OUT-OF-DETENT FOR MANUAL FCS CONTROL. NO AUTOLAND IS
CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-201
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3142-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 201
ITEM: THC
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF A CHANNEL-TRANSDUCER OR SWITCH
FAILURE-OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-202
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3142-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 202
ITEM: THC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: IMMOBILE THC.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL JAMMING-MECHANICAL LINKAGE FAILURE.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
GNC-203
05-I-FC3142-3
GNC
203
THC
TRAHAN, W. H.
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, SHORTED SWITCH.
MANUAL ET SEP REQUIRES A MANUAL-Z TRANSLATION MANEUVER.
ADDITIONAL IOA ANALYSIS OF THIS FAILURE MODE CHANGED THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY TO 3, AGREEING WITH THE NASA FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-301
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3442-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC I D: 301
ITEM: RPTA
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
c
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT ON ONE CHANNEL.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT - 1 CHANNEL.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-302
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3442-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 302
ITEM: RPTA
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ONE CHANNEL.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-303
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM • GNC
MDAC ID: 303
ITEM: RPTA
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT ON ONE CHANNEL.
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA DOES RECOMMEND A
FMEA BEING WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-304
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3442-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 304
ITEM: RPTA
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [P] IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF ONE RPTA DUE TO MECHANICAL FAILURE
FMEA FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL JAMMING OF TRANSDUCER DRIVE OR
LINKAGE FAILURE
AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND FURTHER ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH
THE NASA CRITICALITY. SINCE RM IS PERFORMED ON EACH RPTA
SEPARATELY BUT AT THE SAME TIME AND THEN THE LARGEST VALUE OF THE
TWO SELECTED SIGNALS IS CHOSEN AS THE COMMAND, THE SIGNAL FROM
THE JAMMED RPTA COULD BE SELECTED, IF IT IS GREATER THAN THE
SIGNAL FROM THE OTHER RPTA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-401
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3242-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 401
ITEM: SBTC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OF CNTL LEVER°
FMEA FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL JAMMING.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
GNC-402
05-I-FC3242-2
GNC
402
SBTC
ROBERT O'DONNELL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO TRANSDUCER OUTPUT ON A CMD CHANNEL.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF A CHANNEL-TRANSDUCER.
NO DIFFERENCES. REFERENCE MDAC ID 404 REMARKS. RECOMMEND CHANGE
TO FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF A CHANNEL - TRANSDUCER OR SWITCH.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-43
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-403
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3242-3
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 403
ITEM: SBTC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS XDCR OUTPUT ON A CMD CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT OF ONE CHANNEL.
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
REFERENCE MDAC ID 405 REMARKS. RECOMMEND CHANGE TO FMEA FAILURE
MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT - TRANSDUCER OR SWITCH CHANNEL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-404
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 404
ITEM: SBTC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT ON A TAKEOVER SW CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (NO OUTPUT ON A TAKEOVER
SW CHN). IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDED TO FMEA 05-1-
FC3242-2, CRITICALITY 3/IR. THE PRESENT FAILURE MODE COULD BE
CHANGED TO "LOSS OF A CHANNEL - TRANSDUCER OR SWITCH".
NO NEW FMEA RECOMMENDED, SINCE THE CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE
MODE DOES NOT INCREASE THE EXISTING CRITICALITY OF THE ITEM.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-405
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 405
ITEM: SBTC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: TAKEOVER SW CHN FAILS ON.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (TAKEOVER SW CHN FAILS
ON).
IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDED TO FMEA 05-I-FC3242-3,
CRITICALITY 3/IR. THE PRESENT FAILURE MODE COULD BE CHANGED TO
"ERRONEOUS OUTPUT-TRANSDUCER OR SWITCH CHANNEL".
NO NEW FMEA RECOMMENDED, SINCE THE CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE
MODE DOES NOT INCREASE THE EXISTING CRITICALITY OF THE ITEM.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-406X
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC3242-4
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 406
ITEM: SBTC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARk:
IOA FAILURE MODE:
FMEA FAILURE MODE:
NO DIFFERENCES.
PHYSICAL JAMMING OF TAKEOVER SWITCH.
PHYSICAL JAMMING OF MANUAL TAKEOVER SWITCH.
THE IOA DID NOT COVER THIS ITEM IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS. IOA
DID COVER TAKEOVER SW CHN FAILS ON (ASSESSMENT ID GNC-405), AND
NO OUTPUT ON A TAKEOVER SW CHN (ASSESSMENT ID GNC-404). A NEW
IOAANALYSIS WAS PERFORMED AND AN ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
(ID-406) PROVIDED. IOA AGREED WITH THE NASA/RI ASSESSMENT
RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-410
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7251-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
410
SWITCH-SPD BK/THROT PBI
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER-SWITCH WILL NOT CHANGE
STATE.
DOWNGRADE SPD BK/THROT PBI AUTO SWITCH TO CRIT 3/3. SYSTEM
NORMALLY IN AUTO UNLESS SYSTEM FAILURE REQUIRES MANUAL TAKEOVER
BY THE SBTC TAKEOVER SWITCH. ONCE IN MANUAL MODE, CREW CAN
REMAIN IN SBTC MANUAL CONTROL MODE WITH SOME INCREASE IN WORK
LOAD. THE SBTC TAKEOVER SW MUST BE HELD IN TO MAINTAIN MANUAL
MODE.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASAs REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-410A
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7251-0002
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
410
SWITCH-SPD BK/THROT PBI
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORTS.
DOWNGRADE SPD BK/THROT PBI AUTO SWITCH TO CRIT 3/3. SYSTEM
NORMALLY IN AUTO UNLESS SYSTEM FAILURE REQUIRES MANUAL TAKEOVER
BY THE SBTC TAKEOVER SWITCH. ONCE IN MANUAL MODE, CREW CAN
REMAIN IN SBTC MANUAL CONTROL MODE WITH SOME INCREASE IN WORK
LOAD. THE SBTC TAKEOVER SW MUST BE HELD IN TO MAINTAIN MANUAL
MODE.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASAs REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-411
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7251-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
411
SWITCH-SPD BK/THROT PBI
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[P] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER-SW WILL NOT CHANGE STATE.
DOWNGRADE SPD BK/THROT PBI AUTO SWITCH TO CRIT 3/3. SYSTEM
NORMALLY IN AUTO UNLESS SYSTEM FAILURE REQUIRES MANUAL TAKEOVER
BY THE SBTC TAKEOVER SWITCH. ONCE IN MANUAL MODE, CREW CAN
REMAIN IN SBTC MANUAL CONTROL MODE WITH SOME INCREASE IN WORK
LOAD.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASAs REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOa [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
GNC-501
05-I-GN21-2
GNC
501
IMU
J.M. HIOTT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ F ]
[F]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-502
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-GN21-1
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 502
ITEM: IMU
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
C
[ F ]
[ F ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-510
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200201-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 510
ITEM: IMU POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [*]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ONE BRANCH OF CIRCUIT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN, FAIL TO CONDUCT (DIODES).
FIRST FAILURE UNDETECTED BUT CURRENT STILL CONDUCTED TO THE IMU.
THE SECOND FALIURE ON THE SAME IMU IS DETECTED IN FLIGHT. THE
OUTPUT FROM THIS IMU WILL BE DISCARDED AND ANNUNCIATED BY RM.
BECAUSE THE WORST CASE (2 FAILURES) PASSES ALL SCREENS, IOA
RECOMMENDS ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN AS TO WEATHER OR NOT
THIS IS A CIL ITEM.
* DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE NOT AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF THE
ASSESSMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-510A
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-IMU(03)
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 510
ITEM: IMU POWER CIRCUIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ONE BRANCH OF CIRCUIT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: OPEN, SHORT, OUT-OF-TOLERANCE (RESISTORS).
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-510B
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-IMU(04)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 510
ITEM: IMU POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ONE BRANCH OF CURCUIT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, OPENS,
PREMATURE OPERATION (RPC).
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-511
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200200-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 511
ITEM: IMU POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH - OPEN, SHORTS, FAIL TO TRANSFER FROM
OFF.
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-512
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200200-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 512
ITEM: IMU POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ONE CIRCUIT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORT (CONTACT TO CONTACT), PREMATURE
OPERATIONS.
NO ACTION REQUIRED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-601
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-GN22-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 601
ITEM: STAR TRACKER
LEAD ANALYST- LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-601A
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-GN22-4
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 601
ITEM: STAR TRACKER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: MECHANICAL SHUTTER FAILED CLOSED.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-602
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 602
ITEM: STAR TRACKER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA
IOA
A
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
B
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
R_:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
FMEA BEING WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA DOES RECOMMEND A
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
GNC-603X
05-I-GN22-2
GNC
603
STAR TRACKER
LES DRAPELA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF INPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF INPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
GNC-604X
05-I-GN22-3
GNC
604
STAR TRACKER
LES DRAPELA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: MECHANICAL SHUTTER FAILS OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: MECHANICAL SHUTTER FAILS OPEN.
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
GNC-610
NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
GNC
610
CIRCUIT-STAR TRACKER POWER
LES DRAPELA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT BREAKER OR SWITCH FAILS CLOSED.
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA DOES RECOMMEND A
FMEA BEING WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-611
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200100-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
611
CIRCUIT-STAR TRACKER POWER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES (LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTS,
PREMATURE POWER)
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-612
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200100-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
612
CIRCUIT-STAR TRACKER POWER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH SHORTS TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES (LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTS,
PREMATURE POWER)
NO DIFFERENCES.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-65
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-701
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-3
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 701
ITEM: COAS
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [p]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: COAS LIGHT OUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF RETICLE ILLUMINATION (BULB FAILS TO
LIGHT, DIMMER FAILS).
AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-702
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 702
ITEM: COAS
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA
IOA
A
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
B
[ ]
[P]
IN]
C
[ ]
[p]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: RETICLE BROKEN.
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
FMEA BEING WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
IOA DOES RECOMMEND A
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-703X
NASA FMEA #: 07-1-725101-1
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 703
ITEM: COAS
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: INCORRECT MOUNTING OR UNABLE TO MOUNT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: INCORRECT MOUNTING OR UNABLE TO MOUNT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-710
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
710
CIRCUIT - COAS POWER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT BREAKER OR SWITCH FAILS CLOSED.
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA DOES RECOMMEND A
FMEA BEING WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-711
NASA FMEA #: 05-6Y-202000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
711
CIRCUIT - COAS POWER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES (LOSS OF POWER, OPENS,
SHORTS, INADVERTENT OUTPUT).
AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND FURTHER ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH
THE NASA CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-712
NASA FMEA #: 05-6Y-202000-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
712
CIRCUIT - COAS POWER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILS OFF.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES (LOSS OF POWER, OPENS,
SHORTS, INADVERTENT OUTPUT).
AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND FURTHER ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH
THE NASA CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-801
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-GN28-2
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 801
ITEM: ADTA
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-802
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-GN28-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 802
ITEM: ADTA
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-810
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-GN0801-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 810
ITEM: ADTA POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT BREAKER-ALL CREDIBLE MODES OPENS,
CLOSES, PREMATURE OPERATION, SHORTS.
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-811
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-GN0801-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 811
ITEM: ADTA POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT BREAKER-ALL CREDIBLE MODES, OPENS,
CLOSES, PREMATURE OPERATION, SHORTS.
NO ACTION REQUIRED - FMEA DEFINES A HIGHER CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-812
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-GN0802-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 812
ITEM: ADTA POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: RESISTOR (RLR07C5101GR) SHORTS TO GROUND OR
OPENS.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES - OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE,
SHORTED TO GROUND.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-901
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FCI042-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 901
ITEM: RGA
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
FIRST FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED AND THE OUTPUT DISCARDED BY RM.
SECOND FAILURE MAY NOT BE ANNUNCIATED, BUT MCC CAN DETECT.
FLIGHT RULES DICTATES PRIORITY FLIGHT FOR THE LOSS OF ONE RGA.
MAY IMPACT MISSION. REDUNDANCY OF FOUR RGA'S.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-902
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FCI042-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 902
ITEM: RGA
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
CO.ARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
FIRST FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED AND THE OUTPUTS DISCARDED BY RM.
THE SECOND FAILURE MAY NOT BE ANNUNCIATED, BUT THE MCC CAN
DETECT. FLIGHT RULES INVOKE PRIORITY FLIGHT ON THE FIRST
FAILURE. MAY IMPACT MISSION. REDUNDANCY OF FOUR RGA.
ADDITIONAL IOA ANALYSIS CHANGED THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 2 AND
FAILED THE B SCREEN. THIS RESULTS IN NO DIFFERENCE WITH NASA
FMEA FOR THE WORST CASE WHERE THE ERRONEOUS OUTPUT IS BELOW THE
RM TRIP LEVEL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
GNC-903
05-60-FCI043-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 903
ITEM: PWR SW RGA 1,2,3,4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
TRAHAN, W. H.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IDA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(AOD/OELETe)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IDA FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, FAIL OFF.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION-INADVERTENTLY OPENS,
SHORT TO GROUND, INTERNAL SHORT.
SWITCHES 1 AND 4 ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-904
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200301-1
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
904
DIODES & RESIST (ORB)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [*]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAIL TO CONDUCT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: (DIODES ONLY) OPEN (ELECTRICAL)-FAILS OPEN,
FAIL TO CONDUCT.
FIRST FAILURE UNDETECTED BUT CURRENT STILL CONDUCTED TO THE
RGA'S. THE SECOND FAILURE ON THE SAME RGA IS DETECTABLE IN
FLIGHT. THE OUTPUT FROM THIS RGA WILL BE DISCARDED AND
ANNUNCIATED BY RM. FLIGHT RULES DICTATES PRIORITY FLIGHT FOR THE
LOSS OF ONE
RGA. BECAUSE THE WORST CASE (2 FAILURES) PASSES ALL SCREENS, IOA
RECOMMENDS ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN AS TO WEATHER OR NOT
THIS BECOMES A CIL ITEM.
* DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE NOT AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF THE
ASSESSMENT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
GNC-904A
05-60-FCI044-0001
GNC
904
DIODES & RESIST (ORB)
TRAHAN, W. H.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: OPEN, FAIL TO CONDUCT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: (RESISTOR) OPEN, SHORTS, HIGH RESISTANCE.
RGA'S i AND 4 ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-905
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-FCI042-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 905
ITEM: RPC'S (ORB)
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON, FAILS OFF. (RGA)
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT-FAIL TO CONDUCT, OPENS,
PREMATURE OPERATIONS. (RGA)
RGA 1 AND 4 ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-950
NASA FMEA #: 05-1-(09), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 950
ITEM: RGA (SRB)
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[P]
[ ]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
IOA FAILURE MODE:
FMEA FAILURE MODE:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
LOSS OF OUTPUT.
LOSS OF OUTPUT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-951
NASA FMEA #: 05-01-(10), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 951
ITEM: RGA (SRB)
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND FURTHER ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH
THE NASA CRITICALITY. FOR MOST CASES, ERRONEOUS ERRORS WILL BE
DETECTED BY FDIR. FOR A WORST CASE SCENARIO IN WHICH THE ERROR
IS BELOW THE FDIR THRESHOLD VALUE, THE ERROR WILL NOT BE
DETECTED AND THE ERRONEOUS DATA WILL BE SENT TO THE SELECTION
FILTER WHERE IT COULD BE SELECTED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-960
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
960
CIRCUIT - SRB RGA POWER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-961
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
GNC
961
CIRCUIT - SRB RGA POWER
LES DRAPELA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS"
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1001
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC2042-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
I001
ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1002
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC2042-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1002
ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH NASA AND FURTHER ANALYSIS, IOA AGREES WITH
THE NASA CRITICALITY. FOR MOST CASES ERRONEOUS ERRORS WILL BE
DETECTED BY FDIR. FOR A WORST CASE SCENARIO IN WHICH THE ERROR
IS BELOW THE FDIR THRESHOLD VALUE, THE ERROR WILL NOT BE
DETECTED AND THE ERRONEOUS DATA WILL BE SENT TO THE SELECTION
FILTER WHERE IT COULD BE SELECTED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1010
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-FCI045-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
I010
CIRCUIT-AAIS 1 & 2 POWER
LEAD ANALYST : LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT (AA'S l&2) FAILS CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILS OPEN, FAILS CLOSED.
THE FMEA COVERED TWO FAILURE MODES, BUT IOA AGREES WITH THE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY WHICH IS FOR THE "FAILED OPEN" CASE. NO
ADDITIONAL FMEA IS RECOMMENDED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1011
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-FCI045-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
i011
CIRCUIT-AAtS 1 & 2 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT (AA'S 1&2) FAILS OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILS OPEN, FAILS CLOSED.
THE FMEA COVERED TWO FAILURE MOES, BUT IOA AGREES WITH THE
HIGHEST CRITICALITY WHICH IS FOR THE "FAILED OPEN" CASE. NO
ADDITIONAL FMEA IS RECOMMENDED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1012
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(03), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1012
CIRCUIT-AAVS 3 & 4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST : LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE:
FMEA FAILURE MODE:
RESISTANCE.
NO DIFFERENCE.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
POWER CIRCUIT (AA'S 3&4) FAILS OPEN.
LIMITING RESISTORS FAIL OPEN, SHORT, HIGH
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1012A
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(04), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
I012
CIRCUIT-AA'S 3 & 4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT (AA'S 3&4) FAILS OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FLT CONTROL (AA 3&4) - PREMATURE
OPERATION, SHORTS, OPENS.
NO DIFFERENCE.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1012B
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(05), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1012
CIRCUIT-AA'S 3 & 4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT (AA'S 3&4) FAILS OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: RPC - LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT,
OPENS, PREMATURE OPERATION.
NO DIFFERENCE.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1013
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
GNC
1013
CIRCUIT-AA'S 3 & 4 POWER
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
LES DRAPELA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
CP] CP] CP]
[N] [N] [N]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT (AA'S 3&4) FAILS CLOSED.
NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA DOES RECOMMEND A
FMEA BEING WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/25/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1014X
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200501-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1014
DIODE - AA'S 3 & 4 POWER CIRCUITS
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: DIODE FAILS OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL).
AA'S 3 & 4 HAVE TWO POWER CIRCUITS. THE LOSS OF ONE DIODE
REMOVES ONE POWER CIRCUIT ONLY. THE OTHER CIRCUIT CONTINUES TO
SUPPLY POWER TO THE RGA. THE LOSS OF ONE DIODE CANNOT BE
DETECTED, THEREFORE SCREEN B IS FAILED.
NO CIL RETENTION RATIONALE WAS AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF THIS
ASSESSMENT.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II01
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW[
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1101
ITEM: ASA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ N ] C N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] C P ] C P ] C ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ISOL CMD FL OFF IN ONE CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT NASA/RI COVERED THIS FAILURE MODE IN FMEA
05-I-FC6042-2 (ERRONEOUS OUTPUT) CRIT 3/IR. RECOMMEND NASA/RI
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN FMEA TO CLARIFY FAILURE MODES
ANALYZED. IOA DOES RECOMMEND THAT A NEW FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR
COMPLETENESS. THE ISOL CMD FL OFF WILL INHIBIT THE ISOLATION OF
THE CHN IF AN ASA SYSTEM FAILURE IS DETECTED.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II02
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1102
ITEM: ASA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ISOL CMD FL ON FOR ONE CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT NASA/RI COVERED THIS FAILURE MODE IN FMEA
05-I-FC6042-2 (ERRONEOUS OUTPUT) CRIT 3/IR. RECOMMEND NASA/RI
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN FMEA TO CLARIFY FAILURE MODES
ANALYZED. IOA DOES RECOMMEND THAT A NEW FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR,
COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
z/23/87
GNC-II03
05-I-FC6042-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1103
ITEM: ASA
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT :
ROBERT O'DONNELL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO POSITION ERR CMD TO ACTR CHN (NULL OUTPUT).
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA's REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE AS SHOWN
IN THE NASA-JSC FMEA REVIEW COMMENTS. DUAL NULL (ASA LOSS OF
OUTPUT) FAILURES OF AEROSURFACE RATE COMMANDS WILL BE UNDETECTED
BY THE ASA DELTA P FAULT DETECT CIRCUIT AND MCC MONITORING
SYSTEMS WHILE SURFACE POSITIONS ARE NOT CHANGING. THE TWO
UNDETECTED NULL FAILURES, DURING ATMOSPHERIC FLIGHT MANEUVERS,
WILL CAUSE A 2 ON 2 CHN FORCE FIGHT AND MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE. AS A RESULT OF NASA REVISIONS, AND FURTHER IOA ASA
FAILURE ANALYSIS, IOA DOES NOT RECOMMEND A CHANGE TO THE EXISTING
FMEA REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II04
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC6042-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1104
ITEM: ASA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS POSITION ERROR CMD TO ACTR.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-99
APPENDIXC
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II05
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1105
ITEM: ASA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT OIDONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT, OR ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ONE POSITION.
FDBK XDCR CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT NASA/RI COVERED THIS FAILURE MODE IN FMEA
05-I-FC6042-2. SINCE THIS FAILURE MODE AFFECTS ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
IN FMEA 05-I-FC6042-2 AND HAS THE SAME CRITICALITY (3/IR), IOA
DOES RECOMMEND THAT A NEW FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-100
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II06
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1106
ITEM: ASA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ONE SEC DELTA P
FDBK XDCR CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT NASA/RI COVERED THIS FAILURE MODE IN FMEA
05-I-FC6042-2. SINCE THIS FAILURE MODE AFFECTS ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
IN FMEA 05-I-FC6042-2 AND HAS THE SAME CRITICALITY (3/IR), IOA
DOES RECOMMEND THAT A NEW FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-101
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II07
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1107
ITEM: ASA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON 1 ELVN PRI DELTA
P FDBK XDCR CHN.
FMEAFAILURE MODE: NONE.
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT NASA/RI COVERED THIS FAILURE MODE IN FMEA
05-I-FC6042-2. SINCE THIS FAILURE MODE AFFECTS ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
IN FMEA 05-1-FC6042-2 AND HAS THE SAME CRITICALITY (3/IR), IOA
DOES RECOMMEND THAT A NEW FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-I02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II08
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1108
ITEM: ASA
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: BDY FLP CMD CHN (i OF 3) INOPERATIVE.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
SINCE THIS FAILURE MODE MAY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED DURING ANALYSIS
OF FMEA 05-I-FC6042"2 WITH THE SAME CRITICALITY (3/IR), IOA DOES
RECOMMEND THAT A NEW FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-III0
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7244-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
iii0
CIRCUIT-FCS CHN CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
CO.ARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED (AT
TRANSFER/PREMATURE).
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER.
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE FOR
CHANGING SCREEN "A" FROM P (PASS) TO F (FAIL). SWITCH NORMALLY
REMAINS IN AUTO POSITION DURING GROUND TURNAROUND TESTING, AND IS
FUNCTIONALLY CHECKED ONLY AFTER A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF
FLIGHTS. THE CIL WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATION OF THE
RETENTION RATIONALE. REDUNDANT ITEMS PASS SCREEN-A, IF THEY ARE
CAPABLE OF CHECKOUT DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-I04
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-IIII
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7244-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
Iiii
CIRCUIT-FCS CHN CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND (AT TRANSFER/PREMATURE).
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE FOR
CHANGING SCREEN "A" FROM P (PASS) TO F (FAIL). SWITCH NORMALLY
REMAINS IN AUTO POSITION DURING GROUND TURNAROUND TESTING, AND IS
FUNCTIONALLY CHECKED ONLY AFTER A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF
FLIGHTS. THE CIL WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATION OF THE
RETENTION RATIONALE. REDUNDANT ITEMS PASS SCREEN-A, IF THEY ARE
CAPABLE OF CHECKOUT DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-IIIIA
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7244-0002
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
iiii
CIRCUIT-FCS CHN CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND (AT TRANSFER/PREMATURE).
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SHORTED TO GROUND, OPEN, PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE FOR
CHANGING SCREEN "A" FROM P (PASS) TO F (FAIL). SWITCH NORMALLY
REMAINS IN AUTO POSITION DURING GROUND TURNAROUND TESTING, AND IS
FUNCTIONALLY CHECKED ONLY AFTER A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF
FLIGHTS. THE CIL WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATION OF THE
RETENTION RATIONALE. REDUNDANT ITEMS PASS SCREE-A, IF THEY ARE
CAPABLE OF CHECKOUT DURING NORMAL GROUND TURNAROUND.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-I06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-IIIIB
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(06), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
iiii
CIRCUIT-FCS CHN CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND (AT TRANSFER/PREMATURE).
FMEA FAILURE MODE: 1.2K CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (FOR ATVC AND
ASA PWR SUPPLY) FAILS OPEN, OUT-OF-TOLERANCE, OR SHORTED.
NO DIFFERENCES: THE OUT-OF-TOLERANCE AND SHORTED (ZERO
RESISTANCE) FAILURE MODES WERE NOT CONSIDERED BY IOA SINCE THESE
FAILURE MODES WOULD ALWAYS REFLECT A CRITICALITY OF 3/3. THE
"OPEN" FAILURE REFLECTS THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY OF THE
RESISTOR.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-IIIIC
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(08), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
iiii
CIRCUIT-FCS CHN CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS
OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND (AT TRANSFER/PREMATURE).
FMEA FAILURE MODE: 1.2K CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (FOR OVERRIDE
SIGNAL TO GPC) FAILS OPEN, OUT-OF-TOLERANCE, OR SHORTED.
THE OUT-OF-TOLERANCE AND SHORTED (ZERO RESISTANCE) FAILURE MODES
WERE NOT CONSIDERED BY IOA SINCE THESE FAILURE MODES WOULD ALWAYS
REFLECT A CRITICALITY OF 3/3. THE "OPEN" FAILURE REFLECTS THE
WORST CASE CRITICALITY OF THE RESISTOR.
IOA FAILURE MODE INCLUDED ALL SWITCH CONTACTS OR RESISTORS FAILED
OPEN WITH WORST CASE CRITICALITY OF 3/IR FOR PREL FMEA NO 05-60-
(06). IOA AGREES WITH A CRITICALITY OF 3/3 FOR THE CURRENT
LIMITING RESISTOR IN THE OVERRIDE CHN. OVERRIDE POSITION ONLY
REQUIRED IF PREVIOUS FAILURES EXIST IN THE ASA/ATVC SYSTEM.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-III2
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(13), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1112
CIRCUIT-FCS CHN CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: DIODE FAILS OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: DIODE OPEN BETWEEN FCS SWITCH OVERRIDE AND
AUTO POSITIONS.
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE NEW FMEA. IF DIODES
FAIL OPEN, THE FCS CHN SWITCH IN OVERRIDE WILL REMOVE POWER FROM
ASA/ATVC PWR SUPPLY AND ISSOLATE CHN FROM SYSTEM. OVERRIDE
POSITION ONLY REQUIRED IF PREVIOUS FAILURES EXIST IN THE ASA/ATVC
SYSTEM. FCS CHN SWITCH IN AUTO WILL RESTORE POWER TO THE
RESPECTIVE ASA/ATVC.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-i09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II30
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200701-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
GNC
1130
CIRCUIT-ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF) , DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: OPEN - 12/35 AMP DIODE (TO PWR SUPPLY).
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE REVISED FMEA. ONE
REDUNDANT DIODE FL OPN IS NOT DETECTABLE. TWO REDUNDANT DIODES
FL OPN ARE DETECTABLE BY LOSS OF PWR TO CHN, AND RESULTS IN
CONTROL CHANNEL ISOLATION. THE CIL WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR
EVALUATION OF THE RETENTION RATIONALE.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-110
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II30A
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200703-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1130
CIRCUIT-ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: OPEN - 12/35 AMP DIODE (TO ISOL VLV DRIVER).
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE REVISED FMEA. THE
DIODES FAILING OPEN WILL CAUSE THE ISOL VALVE DRIVER TO FAIL OFF
AND INHIBIT THE ASA FROM ISOLATING THE CHN IF AN ASA SYSTEM
FAILURE IS DETECTED. ASA-4 (CHN-4) ISOL VLV DRIVERS NOT
REDUNDANTLY POWERED LIKE ASA-I, 2, AND 3.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-Ill
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II30B
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200706-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1130
CIRCUIT-ASAIS 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND (RPC TO ISOL VLV
DRIVER).
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE REVISED FMEA. THE
RPC'S FAILING OPEN WILL CAUSE THE ISOL VALVE DRIVER TO FAIL OFF
AND INHIBIT THE ASA FROM ISOLATING THE CHN IF AN ASA SYSTEM
FAILURE IS DETECTED. ASA-4 (CHN-4) ISOL VLV DRIVERS NOT
REDUNDANTLY POWERED LIKE ASA-1, 2, AND 3.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II30C
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(14), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
GNC
1130
CIRCUIT-ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N/ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ASA POWER SW FAILS TO TRANSFER (OPEN).
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE NEW FMEA. WITH 2 ASA
PWR SWITCHES FAILED TO TRANSFER (OPEN), THERE WILL EXIST A 2 ON 2
ASA CHN FORCE FIGHT WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE
CONTROL. LOSS OF SWITCH IS NOT READILL¥ DETECTABLE, BUT THE
RESULTING LOSS OF RPC PWR AND ASA CHN IS DETECTABLE. LOSS OF
ISOL VLV DRIVER PWR NOT DETECTABLE. THE CIL WAS NOT AVAILABLE
FOR EVALUATION OF THE RETENTION RATIONALE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II30D
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(15), PEEL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
GNC
1130
CIRCUIT-ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ASA POWER SW POLE (CONTACT) FAILS OPEN, SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE NEW FMEA. FOR PWR SW
WORST CASE, 2 CONTACT FAIL OPEN (LOSS OF ISOL DRIVER), 2 CONT
FAIL OPEN (LOSS OF PWR SUPPLY/CHN), 3 CONT FAIL OPEN (LOSS OF
PWR SUPPLY WITHOUT CHN ISOLATION). LOSS OF CONTACTS ARE NOT
READILY DETECTABLE, BUT THE RESULTING LOSS OF RPC PWR AND ASA CHN
IS DETECTABLE. ASA CHN-4 ISOL VALVE DRIVERS NOT REDUNDANTLY
POWERED LIKE CHN I, 2, 3. LOSS OF ISOL VLV DRIVER PWR NOT
DETECTABLE. THE CIL WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATION OF THE
RETENTION RATIONALE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II30E
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(16), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
GNC
1130
CIRCUIT-ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]COMPARE [ /N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: 1.2K CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (FOR ASA ISOL
VALVE DRIVER PWR) FAILS OPEN, OUT-OF-TOLERANCE, OR SHORTED.
THE OUT-OF-TOLERANCE AND SHORTED (ZERO RESISTANCE) FAILURE MODES
WERE NOT CONSIDERED BY IOA SINCE THESE FAILURE MODES WOULD ALWAYS
REFLECT A CRITICALITY OF 3/3. THE "OPEN" FAILURE REFLECTS THE
WORST CASE CRITICALITY OF THE RESISTOR. IOA FALIURE MODE
WAS POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (RPC'S, DIODES, AND SWITCH CIRCUIT)
WITH WORST CASE CRITICALITY OF 3/IR. AFTER FURTHER EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE CRITICALITY OF 3/3 FOR
THE RESISTOR FAILING OPEN, AND LOSS OF ISOL VALVE DRIVER
POWER.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-II30F
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(17), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
GNC
1130
CIRCUIT-ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: RPC FAILS OPEN OR PREMATURE OPERATION (TO ASA
PWR SUPPLY).
NO DIFFERENCES IN NASA/IOA ASSESSMENT OF NEW FMEA. ONE REDUNDANT
RPC FL OPEN IS DETECTABLE ON INSTRUMENTATION. TWO REDUNDANT RPC'S
FAIL OPEN ARE DETECTABLE, AND RESULTS IN CONTROL CHANNEL
ISOLATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
GNC-I131
NONE
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
GNC
1131
CIRCUIT-ASA'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
ROBERT O'DONNELL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS CLOSED (ON), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NA
AFTER THE FMEA REVIEW, NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
IOA DOES RECOMMEND WRITING A NEW FMEA FOR COMPLETENESS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1201
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC6242-I
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1201
ITEM: RJDF
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT TO JET.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT TO ONE OR MORE JETS.
FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED BY RM. JET WILL NOT BE SELECTED.
JETS CAN PERFORM THE DESIRED FUNCTION.
ADDITIONAL IOA ANALYSIS CHANGED THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 2
AGREEING WITH THE NASA FMEA FOR THE WORST CASE LOSS OF FWD RCS
DUMP CAPABILITY.
OTHER
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1203
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC6342-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1203
ITEM: RJDA
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT TO ONE OR MORE JETS.
FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED BY RM. THE JET WILL NOT BE SELECTED BY
THE SOFTWARE. OTHER JETS CAN PERFORM THE FUNCTION.
NO DIFFERENCES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1205
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC6342-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1205
ITEM: RJDA
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT JET FIRING.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1206
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC6242-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1206
ITEM: RJDF
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT JET FIRING.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
GNC-1207 BASELINE [
NONE NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1207
ITEM: PC FEEDBACK
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
TRAHAN, W. H.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. (RJDF)
FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED BY RM. JET WILL NOT BE SELECTED.
JETS CAN PERFORM THE DESIRED FUNCTION.
WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
OTHER
IOA RECOMMENDS A FMEA BE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
GNC-1208 BASELINE [ ]
NONE NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1208
ITEM: PC FEEDBACK
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
TRAHAN, W. H.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
CP] CP] Cp]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [" ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. (RJDA)
FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED BY RM. JET WILL NOT BE SELECTED OTHER
JETS CAN PERFORM THE DESIRED FUNCTION. IOA RECOMMENDS A FMEA BE
WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1211
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1211
ITEM: POWER CIRCUIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAIL CLOSE (INADVERTENT OUTPUT) RJDF.
IOA DOES RECOMMEND WRITING A FMEA FOR COMPLETENESS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1212
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1212
ITEM: POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAIL CLOSE (INADVERTENT OUTPUT) RJDA.
IOA DOES RECOMMEND WRITING A FMEA FOR COMPLETENESS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1213
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1213
ITEM: POWER CIRCUIT
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAIL OPEN (NO OUTPUT) RJDA.
THIS ASSESSMENT ID BEING COVERED BY THE OMS/RCS SUBSYSTEM GROUP.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1214
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1214
ITEM: POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAIL OPEN (NO OUTPUT) RJDF.
THIS ASSESSMENT IS BEING COVERED BY THE OMS/RCS SUBSYSTEM GROUP.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1301
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1301
ITEM: ATVC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ISOL CMD FL OFF IN ONE CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT NASA/RI COVERED THIS FAILURE MODE IN FMEA
05-I-FC6542-2 (ERRONEOUS OUTPUT) CRIT - 3/IR.
RECOMMEND NASA/RI PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN FMEA TO
CLARIFY FAILURE MODES ANALYZED. IOA DOES RECOMMEND THAT A NEW
FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS. THE ISOL CMD FL OFF WILL
INHIBIT THE ISOLATION OF THE CHN IF AN ATVC SYSTEM FAILURE IS
DETECTED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1302
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1302
ITEM: ATVC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ISOL CMD FL ON FOR ONE CHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT NASA/RI COVERED THIS FAILURE MODE IN FMEA
05-I-FC6542-2 (ERRONEOUS OUTPUT) CRIT - 3/IR.
RECOMMEND NASA/RI PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN FMEA TO
CLARIFY FAILURE MODES ANALYZED. IOA DOES RECOMMEND THAT A NEW
FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1303
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC6542-1
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1303
ITEM: ATVC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO POSITION CMD TO ACTR CHN (NULL OUTPUT).
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA's REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE AS SHOWN
IN THE NASA/JSC FMEA REVIEW COMMENTS. DUAL NULL FAILURES (ASA
LOSS OF OUTPUT) OF ACTUATOR POSITION COMMANDS WILL BE UNDETECTED
BY THE ATVC DELTA P FAULT DETECT CIRCUIT AND MCC
MONITORING SYSTEMS WHILE ENGINES ARE NEAR ZERO ENGINE GIMBAL
POSITION. THE TWO UNDETECTED NULL FAILURES, DURING ASCENT, WILL
CAUSE A 2 ON 2 CHANNEL FORCE FIGHT AND MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
IOA DOES NOT RECOMMEND A CHANGE TO THE EXISTING FMEA REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1304
NASA FMEA #: 05-1-FC6542-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1304
ITEM: ATVC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE IN/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS POSITION CMD TO ACTR.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT.
IOA DOES CONCUR WITH NASA's REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE AS SHOWN
IN THE FMEA REVISIONS. IF FAILURES ARE PRESENT DURING PRELAUNCH,
WHEN ATVC FAULT DETECT IS INHIBITED, LAUNCH HOLD WILL BE
INITIATED PRIOR TO SRB IGNITION. AS A RESULT OF NASA's
REVISIONS AND FURTHER IOA ATVC FAILURE ANALYSIS, IOA DOES NOT
RECOMMEND A CHANGE TO THE EXISTING FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1305
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1305
ITEM: ATVC
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ON ONE SEC DELTA P
FDBK XDCRCHN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NONE.
IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT NASA/RI COVERED THIS FAILURE MODE IN FMEA
05-I-FC6542-2, CRIT - 3/IR. THE IOA DOES RECOMMEND THAT A NEW
FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR COMPLETENESS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1310
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200601-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1310
CIRCUIT- ATVCIS 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: OPEN - 12 AMP DIODE (TO POWER SUPPLY).
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE REVISED FMEA. ONE
REDUNDANT DIODE FL OPN IS NOT DETECTABLE. TWO REDUNDANT DIODES
FL OPN ARE DETECTABLE BY LOSS OF PWR TO CHN, AND RESULTS IN
CONTROL CHANNEL ISOLATION. THE CIL WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR
EVALUATION OF THE RETENTION RATIONALE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1310A
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200602-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1310
CIRCUIT- ATVCWS 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT - RPC (TO ISOL VLV DRIVER).
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE REVISED FMEA. THE
RPC'S FAILING OPEN WILL CAUSE THE ISOL VALVE DRIVER TO FAIL OFF
AND INHIBIT THE MPS ATVC FROM ISOLATING THE CHN IF AN MPS ATVC
SYSTEM FAILURE IS DETECTED. ISOL VALVE DRIVERS NOT REDUNDANTLY
POWERED IN EACH ATVC (CHN).
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1310B
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(07), PREL REF NO.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1310
CIRCUIT- ATVC'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF) DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: 1.2K CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (FOR MPS ATVC
ISOL VALVE DRIVER PWR) FAILS OPEN, OUT-OF-TOLERANCE, OR SHORTED.
THE OUT-OF-TOLERANCE AND SHORTED (ZERO RESISTANCE) FAILURE MODES
WERE NOT CONSIDERED BY IOA SINCE THESE FAILURE MODES WOULD ALWAYS
REFLECT A CRITICALITY OF 3/3. THE "OPEN" FAILURE REFLECTS THE
WORST CASE CRITICALITY OF THE RESISTOR. IOA FAILURE MODE
WAS POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (RPC'S, DIODES, AND SWITCH CIRCUIT)
WITH WORST CASE CRITICALITY OF 3/IR. AFTER FURTHER EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE CRITICALITY OF 3/3 FOR
THE RESISTOR FAILING OPEN, AND LOSS OF ISOL VALVE
DRIVER POWER. THE ISOL CMD FL OFF WILL INHIBIT THE ISOLATION OF
THE CHN IF AN ATVC SYSTEM FAILURE IS DETECTED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1310C
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(10), PREL REF NO.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1310
CIRCUIT- ATVCWS 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST : ROBERT 0 'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF) DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ATVC POWER SW FAILS TO TRANSFER (OPEN)
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEAAND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE NEW FMEA. WITH 2 ATVC
PWR SWITCHES FAILED TO TRANSFER (OPEN), THERE WILL EXIST A 2 ON 2
ATVC CHN FORCE FIGHT WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE CONTROL. LOSS OF SWITCH IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE, BUT
THE RESULTING LOSS OF RPC PWR AND ATVC CHN IS DETECTABLE. LOSS
OF ISOLVLV DRIVER PWR NOT DETECTABLE. THE CIL WAS NOT AVAILABLE
FOR EVALUATION OF THE RETENTION RATIONALE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1310D
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(11), PREL REF NO.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1310
CIRCUIT- ATVC'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ F ]
[P]
CN]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF) DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ATVC POWER SW POLE (CONTACT) FAILS OPEN,
SHORTED, PREMATURE OPERATION.
AFTER NASA/RI REEVALUATION OF FMEA AND FURTHER IOA EVALUATION OF
SYSTEM OPERATION, IOA DOES CONCUR WITH THE NEW FMEA. FOR PWR SW
WORST CASE, 1 CONTACT FAIL OPEN (LOSS OF ISOL DRIVER), 2 CONT
FAIL OPEN (LOSS OF PWR SUPPLY/CHN), 3 CONT FAIL OPEN (LOSS OF
PWR SUPPLY WITHOUT CHN ISOLATION). LOSS OF CONTACTS ARE NOT
READILY DETECTABLE, BUT THE RESULTING LOSS OF RPC PWR AND ATVC
CHN IS DETECTABLE. ISOL VLV DRIVERS ARE REDUNDANTLY POWERED IN A
CHN. LOSS OF ISOL VLV DRIVER PWR NOT DETECTABLE. THE CIL WAS
NOT AVAILABLE FOR EVALUATION OF THE RETENTION RATIONALE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1310E
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(12), PREL REF NO.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1310
CIRCUIT- ATVC'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS OPEN (OFF) DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: RPC FAILS OPEN TO ATVC PWR SUPPLY.
NO DIFFERENCES IN NASA/IOA ASSESSEMENT OF NEW FMEA. ONE
REDUNDANT RPC FL OPN IS DETECTABLE ON INSTRUMENTATION. TWO
REDUNDANT RPC'S FL OPEN ARE DETECTABLE, AND RESULTS IN CONTROL
CHANNEL ISOLATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1311
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1311
CIRCUIT- ATVC'S 1,2,3,4 POWER
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: POWER CIRCUIT FAILS CLOSED (ON), DURING POWER
TRANSFER OR PREMATURELY.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: NA
AFTER THE FMEA REVIEW, NASA/RI DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE.
IOA DOES RECOMMEND WRITING A NEW FMEA FOR COMPLETENESS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1400
NASA FMEA #: 05-1-FC7252-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1400
CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: BODY FLAP UP/DOWN SWITCH CONTACT OR CURRENT
LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, SHORTED TO
GROUND, INTERNAL SHORTS.
THE BODY FLAP IS CONTROLLED BY THE AUTO/MAN MODE (PBI SW'S) AND
THE MANUAL UP/DOWN TOGGLE SWITCHES. VEHICLE ATTITUDE CAN BE
MAINTAINED WITH BODY FLAP IN AUTO OR MANUAL MODE.
WITH BODY FLAP SWITCH FAILED OPEN, USE SWITCH IN OTHER CREW
STATION OR SWITCH TO BODY FLAP AUTO MODE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1401
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7252-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1401
CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: BODY FLAP UP/DOWN SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, SHORTED TO
GROUND, INTERNAL SHORTS.
THE BODY FLAP IS CONTROLLED BY THE AUTO/MAN MODE (PBI SW'S) AND
THE MANUAL UP/DOWN TOGGLE SWITCHES. VEHICLE ATTITUDE CAN BE
MAINTAINED WITH BODY FLAP IN AUTO OR MANUAL MODE.
WITH BODY FLAP SWITCH FAILED IN UP POSITION, ATTITUDE CONTROL MAY
BE LOST IN BODY FLAP MANUAL MODE. IF BODY FLAP SWITCH FAILS IN
THE DOWN POSITION, THE OTHER CREW POSITION CAN BE USED TO DRIVE
THE BODY FLAP UP, BUT MAY LOSE ATTITUDE
CONTROL WITH AN INCREASE IN WORK LOAD.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1402
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7253-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1402
CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: BODY FLAP AUTO/MAN PBI SWITCH CONTACT OR
CURRENT LIMIT RESISTOR FAILS OPEN OR SHORTED TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION.
THE BODY FLAP IS CONTROLLED BY THE AUTO/MANUAL MODE (PBI SW'S)
AND THE MANUAL UP/DOWN TOGGLE SWITCHES. VEHICLE ATTITUDE CAN BE
MAINTAINED WITH BODY FLAP IN AUTO OR MANUAL MODE.
WITH BODY FLAP PBI SW FAILED OPEN, USE PBI IN OTHER CREW STATION.
IF BOTH PBIs FAIL OPEN, THE BODY FLAP WILL REMAIN IN THE LAST
COMMANDED POSITION (AUTO OR MANUAL).
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1403
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7253-0001
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1403
CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ HA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA FAILURE MODE: BODY FLAP AUTO/MAN PBI SWITCH CONTACT FAILS
CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION.
THE BODY FLAP IS CONTROLLED BY THE AUTO/MANUAL MODE (PBI SW'S)
AND THE MANUAL UP/DOWN TOGGLE SWITCHES. VEHICLE ATTITUDE CAN BE
MAINTAINED WITH BODY FLAP IN AUTO OR MANUAL MODE.
THE SW CONTACT FAILURES ARE HANDLED BY THE STANDARD 3 CONTACT SW
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT (P/f). SW RM DESELECTS FIRST FAILED CONTACT
AND REQUIRES THE "AND" OF TWO CONTACTS FOR AN OUTPUT. IF SW
FAILS ON (CONTACTS SHORTED), THE BODY FLAP CONTROL CIRCUITS
WILL REMAIN IN THE LAST COMMANDED POSITION (AUTO OR MAN). THE
PBI FAILURE IN MANUAL MODE WILL CAUSE AN INCREASE IN CREW
WORKLOAD.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-143
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
GNC-1403A
05-I-FC7253-0002
GNC
1403
CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
ROBERT O'DONNELL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: BODY FALP AUTO/MAN PBI SWITCH CONTACT FAILS
CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORTS.
THE BODY FLAP IS CONTROLLED BY THE AUTO/MAN MODE (PBI SW'S) AND
THE MANUAL UP/DOWN TOGGLE SWITCHES. VEHIICLE ATTITUDE CAN BE
MAINTAINED WITH BODY FLAP IN AUTO OR MANUALMODE.
WITH BODY FLAP PBI SW FAILED CLOSED, THE BODY FLAP CONTROL
CIRCUIT WILL REMAIN IN THE LAST COMMANDED POSITION (AUTO OR MAN).
THE PBI FAILURE IN MANUAL MODE WILL CAUSE AN INCREASE IN CREW
WORKLOAD.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
GNC-1404
05-I-FC7252-0001
GNC
1404
CIRCUIT-BODY FLAP CNTL
ROBERT O'DONNELL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: BODY FLAP UP/DOWN CMD SWITCH JAMMED.
NASA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND,
INTERNAL SHORTS.
THE BODY FLAP IS CONTROLLED BY THE AUTO/MAN MODE (PBI SW'S) AND
THE MANUAL UP/DOWN TOGGLE SWITCHES. VEHICLE ATTITUDE CAN BE
MAINTAINED WITH BODY FLAP IN AUTO OR MANUAL MODE.
WITH BODY FLAP SWITCH JAMMED IN UP POSITION, ATTITUDE CONTROL MAY
BE LOST IN BODY FLAP MANUAL MODE. WITH BODY FLAP SWITCH JAMMED
IN DOWN POSITION, THE OTHER CREW POSITION CAN BE USED TO DRIVE
THE BODY FLAP UP, BUT MAY LOSE ATTITUDE
CONTROL WITH AN INCREASE IN WORK LOAD.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-145
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1501
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7257-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
GNC
1501
A/B DAP PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1502
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7257-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1502
A/B DAP PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOa [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1510
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7258-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1510
ITEM: FWD AUTO/MAN PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF AUTO MODE, FAILS TO
DEPRESS, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORTS, PREMATURE OPERATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1511
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7258-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1511
ITEM: FWD AUTO/MAN PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF AUTO MODE, FAILS TO
DEPRESS, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORTS, PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1515
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7258-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1515
ITEM: AFT AUTO/MAN PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ HA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF AUTO MODE, FAILS TO
DEPRESS, OPEN INTERNAL SHORTS, PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1516
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7258-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1516
ITEM: AFT AUTO/MAN PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE' [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF AUTO MODE, FAILS TO
DEPRESS, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORTS, PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1520
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7259-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1520
NORM/VERN PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[P] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF VENIER MODE, FAILS
TO DEPRESS, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT, PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1521
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7259-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1521
NORM/VERN PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ A ]
CIL
ITEM
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF VERNIER MODE, FAILS
TO DEPRESS, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT, PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1530
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1530
FWD DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N ] [ N 3 [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1531
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-000IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1531
FWD DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 J
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1535
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1535
FWD PULSE ROT PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[P] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1536
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1536
FWD PULSE ROT PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1540
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1540
AFT DISC RATE ROT PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILE CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1541
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1541
AFT DISC RATE ROT PBIIS
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1545
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1545
AFT PULSE ROT PBI 'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATAURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1546
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1546
ITEM: AFT PULSE ROT PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1550
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1550
ACCEL ROT PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[P] [P] [P] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1551
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1551
ACCEL ROT PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-163
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1560
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7260-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
GNC
1560
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
K. PIETZ
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-164
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1561
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7260-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1561
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION; FAILS TO TRANSFER INTO LVLH, FAILS TO
TRANSFER INTO LOW Z.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION. NASA RATES ONLY "FAILS TO TRANSFER INTO LOW Z
AS 312R.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1561B
NASA FMEA #: 05-1-(TBD06)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1561
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE:
FME FAILURE MODE:
LVLH MODE, OPEN.
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
SWMAN MODE LVLH: FAILS TO TRANSFER TO THE
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION. NASA RATES ONLY "FAILS TO TRANSFER INTO LOW Z
AS 3/2R.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1561A
NASA FMEA #: 05-1-(TBD03)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1561
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SW MAN MODE LOW Z TRANSLATION: FAILS TO
TRANSFER INTO LOW Z, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORTS.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION. NASA RATES ONLY "FAILS TO TRANSFER INTO LOW Z
AS 3/2R.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-167
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1570
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7257-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1570
A/B PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF ABILITY TO CHANGE MODES COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-168
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1575
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7258-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1575
ITEM: FWD AUTO PBI
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF AUTO MODE, FAILS TO
DEPRESS, OPEN, PREMATURE OPERATION.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-169
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1576
NASA FMEA #: 05-1-(TBDOI)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1576
ITEM: FWD MAN PBI
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] C NA] C NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OFMANUAL MODE.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-170
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1577
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7258-0001
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1577
ITEM: AFT AUTO/MAN PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODES: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF AUTO MODE, FAILS TO
DEPRESSION, INTERNAL SHORTS, PREMAUTRE OPERATION, FAILS TO
TRANSFER OUT OF MAN.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-171
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC-1580
05-1-(TB002)
GNC
1580
NORM/VERN PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE:
FMEA FAILURE MODE:
NOT EXACT MATCH:
ix]
[ ]
PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF NORMAL.
IOA BELIEVES THAT LOSS OF EITHER NORMAL OR VERN
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-172
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1581
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1581
FWD PULSE & D RATE ROT PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT HAVING ONE MODE PERMANTENTLY SELECTED COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORTDATE 02/03/88 C-173
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1582
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1582
AFT PULSE & D RATE ROT PBI'S
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMAUTRE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT HAVING ONE MODE PREMANENTLY SELECTED COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-174
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1585
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7261-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1585
ACCEL ROT PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION.
IOA BELIEVES THAT HAVING ONE MODE PERMANENTLY SELECTED COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-175
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1586
NASA FMEA #: 05-1-FC7260-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1586
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, OPEN, INTERNAL SHORT,
PREMATURE OPERATION, FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF LVLH, FAILS TO
TRANSFER OUT OF LOW Z.
NASA FINDS ONLY "FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF LVLH" TO BE 2/2. IOA
BELIEVES THAT HAVING ANY POSITION PERMANENTLY SELECTED COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-176
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1586A
NASA FMEA #: 05-1-(TBD04)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1586
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SW MAN MODE LOW Z TRANSLATION: FAILS TO
TRANSFER OUT OF LOW Z, PREMATURE OPERATION, SHOCK.
NASA FINDS ONLY "FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF LVLH" TO BE 2/2. IOA
BELIEVES THAT HAVING ANY POSITION PERMANENTLY SELECTED COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION./
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1586B
NASA FMEA #: 05-1-(TBD05)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1586
TRANSLATION PBI'S (FWD & AFT)
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: PBI STUCK IN DEPRESSED POSITION.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: SW, MAN MODE LVLH: FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF
LVLH MODE, PREMATURE OPERATION, SHORT.
NASA FINDS ONLY "FAILS TO TRANSFER OUT OF LVLH t' TO BE 2/2. IOA
BELIEVES THAT HAVING ANY POSITION PERMANENTLY SELECTED COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION./
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1590
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200800-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1590
FC ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT" IS INCLUDED IN NASA FAILURE MODE
"ALL CREDIBLE MODES". NO OTHER DIFFERENCES.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1591
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200800-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1591
FC ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE "INADVERTENT OUTPUT" IS INCLUDED IN NASA FAILURE
MODE "ALL CREDIBLE MODES". NO OTHER DIFFERENCES.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/23/86
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1593
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-200800-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1593
FC ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: K. PIETZ
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA DID NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESS THIS FAILURE MODE. LOSS OF
FUNCTION OF ONE ACA (ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY) WOULD NOT BE
CRITICAL, BUT LOSS OF FUNCTION OF ALL FIVE ACAs COULD JEOPARDIZE
CREW/VEHICLE.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1601
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7250-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1601
ENTRY MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT (INCORRECT NUMBER OF CONTACTS
ENERGIZED).
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES - FAILURE TO TRANSFER,
SHORTED.
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1602
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7250-0001
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1602
ENTRY MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
_DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: JAMMED SWITCH.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES - FAILURE TO TRANSFER,
SHORTED.
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1801
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2659-2
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1801
ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSHBUTTON OR ABORT MODE ROTARY
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN OR RESISTOR AIR1, AIR2, AIR3 SHORTED
TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: PUSHBUTTON SWITCH OPENS.
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1801A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-200400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1801
ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSHBUTTON OR ABORT MODE ROTARY
SWITCH CONTACT FAILED OPEN OR RESISTOR AIR1, AIR2, AIR3 SHORTED
TO GROUND.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES - LOSS OF PWR, OPENS,
SHORTS, CLOSES, INADVERTENT OPERATION.
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1802
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2659-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1802
ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSHBUTTON SWITCH OR ABORT MODE
ROTARY SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION - INADVERTENTLY
CONDUCTS, INTERNALLY FAILED CLOSED (MULTIPOLES).
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1802A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-200400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1802
ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ F ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSHBUTTON SWITCH OR ABORT MODE
ROTARY SWITCH CONTACT FAILED CLOSED.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES - LOSS OF PWR, OPENS,
CLOSES, INADVERTENT OPERATION.
ACTION REQUIRED - UPDATE FMEA CRITICALITY TO 2/IR - ADD TO CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1803
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2659-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1803
ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSHBUTTON SWITCH FAILED OPEN OR
ROTARY SWITCH FAILED OPEN IN THE POSITION REQUIRED FOR A SELECTED
ABORT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: PUSHBUTTON SWITCH OPENS - FAILS TO CLOSE,
FAILS TO CONDUCT (MULTI-CONTACTS).
ACTION REQUIRED - UPDATE FMEA CRITICALITY - ADD TO CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1803A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-200400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1803
ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSHBUTTON SWITCH FAILED OPEN OR
ROTARY SWITCH FAILED OPEN IN THE POSITION REQUIRED FOR ABORT.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES - LOSS OF PWR, OPENS,
CLOSES, INADVERTENT OPERATION.
ACTION REQUIRED - UPDATE FMEA CRITICALITY TO 2/IR - ADD TO CIL.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1804
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-2659-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1804
ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[Y]
[F]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [X]*
[P] [P] [X]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSHBUTTON FAILED CLOSED OR ROTARY
SWITCH FAILED CLOSED IN A POSITION OTHER THAN THE REQUIRED ABORT
MODE.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: PUSHBUTTON INADVERTENT OPERATION -
INADVERTENTLY CONDUCTS, INTERNALLY FAILED CLOSED (MULTIPOLES).
ACTION REQUIRED - UPDATE FMEA CRITICALITY TO i/i.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1804A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6-200400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1804
ABORT MODE SWITCH CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J.M. HIOTT
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: ABORT MODE PUSHBUTTON FAILED CLOSED OR ROTARY
SWITCH FAILED CLOSED IN A POSITION OTHER THAN THE REQUIRED ABORT
MODE.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES, LOSS OF PWR, OPENS,
SHORTS, CLOSES, INADVERTENT OPERATION.
ACTION REQUIRED - NONE ACTION COVERED IN GNC-1802A, GNCIS03A.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1901
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1901
ITEM: ATT REF PB
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAIL OPEN.
IOA DOES RECOMMEND A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE SINCE THE
CRITICALITY IS 3/IR AND PASSES ALL SCREENS. THE OTHER PUSHBUTTON
IS AVAILABLE.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1902
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1902
ITEM: ATT REF PB
LEAD ANALYST: TRAHAN, W. H.
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: CIRCUIT FAIL CLOSED.
IOA DOES RECOMMEND A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE SINCE THE
CRITICALITY IS 3/1R AND PASSES ALL REDUNDANCY SCREENS.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
GNC-1950X
05-60-02, PREL REF NO.
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
GNC
1950
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
LES DRAPELA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE, SHORTS.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY MEASUREMENT ISOLATION
RESISTORS-OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE, SHORTED TO GROUND.
NO DIFFERENCE.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1951X
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(01), PREL REF NO.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
GNC
1951
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE:
SHORTS
FMEA FAILURE MODE:
SHORTED.
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RGA (12 RESISTORS) OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE,
RGA (12 RESISTORS) OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE,
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1952X
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(18), PREL REF NO.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1952
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: OPENS, OUT-OF-TOLERANCE, SHORTS.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ASA MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS FAIL OPEN,
OUT-OF-TOLERANCE, SHORTED.
NO DIFFERENCES: THE INSTRUMENTATION DATA IS USED TO MONITOR
CIRCUIT OPERATION, AND NOT REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL OR
OPERATION.
DURING THE ORIGINALANAL¥SIS, IOA DID NOT DOCUMENT THE FAILURE OF
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS IN MONITORING CIRCUITS. A NEW
ANALYSIS WORKSHEET (MDAC ID-1950) WAS PROVIDED. IOA DOES CONCUR
WITH THE NEW FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1953X
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-(09), PREL REF NO.
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1953
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/nmC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: OPENS, OUT-OF-TOLERANCE, SHORTS.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: ATVC MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS FAIL
OPEN, OUT-OF-TOLERANCE, SHORTED.
NO DIFFERENCES: THE INSTRUMENTATION DATA IS USED TO MONITOR
CIRCUIT OPERATION, AND NOT REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE CONTROL OR
OPERATION.
DURING THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS, IOA DID NOT DOCUMENT THE FAILURE OF
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS IN MONITORING CIRCUITS. A NEW
ANALYSIS WORKSHEET (MDAC ID-1950) WAS PROVIDED. IOA DOES CONCUR
WITH THE NEW FMEA.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: GNC-1954X
NASA FMEA #: 05-60-IMU(05)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GNC
1954
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA FAILURE MODE: IMU (15 RESISTORS) OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE.
FMEA FAILURE MODE: IMU (15 RESISTORS) OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE.
NO ACTION REQUIRED - RESULTS ARE THE SAME.
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-198
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
D-I
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
NASA FMEA IOA ITEM FAILURE MODE
ID NAME
05-I-FC3042-I I01 RHC PHY JAMMING/BINDING
05-I-FC3142-I 202 THC IMMOBLE (JAM/BIND)
05-I-FC3442-3 304 RPTA LOSS OF ONE RPTA
05-I-FC3242-I 401 SBTC PHY JAMMING/BINDING
05-I-FC3242-4 406 SBTC SW CONTACT FAIL CLOSE
05-I-GN21-2
05-60-200200-2
05-I-GN21-1
05-60-200201-1
501 IMU
501 IMU
502 IMU
510 IMU DIODE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
NO OUTPUT
FAILED OPEN
05-I-FCI042-2 902
05-60-200301-1,-2 904
05-1 - SRB -2 951
05-60-GN0804-I,-2 960
05-60-FCI042-I 906
RGA (ORB)
RGA (ORB) DIODE
RGA (SRB)
RGA (SRB) DIODE
RGA (ORB) RPC
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
FAILED OPEN
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
FAILED OPEN
FAILED OPEN
05-I-FC2042-2 1002
05-60-200501-1,-2 1014
AA
AA DIODE
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
FAILED OPEN
05-I-FC6042-I 1103
05-60-200700-1 1130
05-60-200701-I,-2 1130
05-60-200708-1 1130
05-60-200709-1 1130
ASA
ASA PWR CKT
I| I! II
I! 11 1!
11 f! !!
NULL OUTPUT
FAILED OPEN
if !!
!% l!
l! I!
05-I-FC6242-I
05-I-FC6342-2
O5-I-FC6242-2
1201
1205
1206
RJDF
RJDA
RJDF
NO OUTPUT TO JET
INADVERT JET FIRING
INADVERT JET FIRING
05-I-FC6542-I
05-60-200600-1
05-60-200601-I,-2
05-60-200602-1
05-60-200606-1
05-I-FC7258-2
05-I-FC7259-2
1303
1310
1310
1310
1310
1576
1580
ATVC
ATVC PWR CKT
1! !I 11
1! !! $!
li !! !!
ORB DAP MAN PB
ORB DAP NOR/VER PB
NULL OUTPUT
FAILED OPEN
!! !1
I! !!
l! !!
FAILED CLOSED
FAILED CLOSED
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_PPENDIX E
DETAILED _ALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
16, Analysis of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control Subsystem
FMEA/CIL (16 December 1986). Prior results were obtained
independently and documented before starting the FMEA/CIL
assessment activity. Supplemental analysis was performed to
address failure modes not previously considered by the IOA. Each
sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed, parent
assembly and function performed. For each failure mode possible
causes are identified, and hardware and functional criticality
for each mission phase are determined as described in NSTS 22206,
instructions for preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986.
Failure mode effects are described at the bottom of each sheet
and worst case criticality is identified at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii09187
GNC
406
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SBTC
PHYSICAL JAMMING OF TAKEOVER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: ROBERT O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: LESTER DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) SBTC
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
i/I
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL L2 (31V73A2A2), C3 (35V73A3A3)
PART NUMBER: MC621-0043-3240
c[P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING,
PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR PLT MAN THRUST TAKEOVER, IST FAILURE IS THE NEED FOR DOWNMODE
FROM AUTO TO MANUAL. DURING ASCENT, THE PLTs TAKEOVER SWITCH
JAMMED ON OR OFF WILL RESULT IN EITHER MANUAL OR AUTO THRUST
CAPABILITY. TAL ABORT REQUIRES MANUAL THRUST CAPABILITY.
BOTH CDRs AND PLTs SBTC CONTROLS SPD BRK CMDS DURING ENTRY. IF
ONE TAKEOVER SWITCH JAMS OPEN, OTHER POSITION PERFORMS FUNCTION.
IF TAKEOVER SWITCH JAMS ON, ONLY MANUAL CONTROL OF SPD BRK
EXISTS. SPD BRK IS NORMALLY FLOWN IN AUTO DURING ENTRY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 603 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STAR TRACKER
LOSS OF INPUT
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1) GNC
2 ) STAR TRACKER
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 10V71A7(-Y), A6(-Z)
PART NUMBER: MC431-0128-0012
CAUSES: INPUT CIRCUITRY FAILED DUE TO MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREW CANNOT ISSUE COMMANDS - THE OTHER ST AND COAS SERVE AS
BACKUP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 604 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STAR TRACKER
MECHANICAL SHUTTER FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2 ) STAR TRACKER
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
10V71A7 (-Y) , A6 (-Z)
MC431-0128-0012
CAUSES: VIBRATION, JAMMING, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ST DUE TO SUN DAMAGE.
SERVE AS BACKUP.
THE OTHER ST AND COAS
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: ZlOV18V
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 703
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COAS
INCORRECT MOUNTING OR UNABLE TO MOUNT
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2) COAS
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
STATION)
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 01 (CMD'S STATION),OVERHEAD WINDOW W7 (AFT
V620-660-810
CAUSES: VIBRATION,SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COAS - 2 ST'S AVAILABLE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/25/87
SUBSYSTEM: GNC
MDAC ID: 1014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE - AA'S 3 & 4 POWER CIRCUITS
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
GNC
ACCELEROMETER ASSEMBLY
AA'S 3 & 4 POWER CIRCUIT
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: 83V76A24
PART NUMBER: JANTXINI204RA
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: SHORT TO GROUND, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AA'S 3 & 4 HAVE TWO POWER CIRCUITS. THE LOSS OF ONE DIODE
REMOVES ONE POWER CIRCUIT ONLY, THE OTHER CIRCUIT CONTINUES TO
SUPPLY POWER TO THE RGA. THE LOSS OF ONE DIODE CANNOT BE
DETECTED, THEREFORE SCREEN B IS FAILED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1950 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST : LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GNC
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ]
THROUGHOUT GNC SUBSYSTEM
C [NA ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. ONLY USED TO MONITOR CIRCUITS, NOT REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE
OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1951 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
FAILURE MODE: OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST : LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: THROUGHOUT GNC SUBSYSTEM
PART NUMBER:
C[NA ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. ONLY USED TO MONITOR CIRCUITS, NOT REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE
OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-8
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1952 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) GNC
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
THROUGHOUT GNC SUBSYSTEM
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. ONLY USED TO MONITOR CIRCUITS, NOT REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE
OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
3/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
GNC FLIGHT:
1953 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE, SHORTS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) GNC
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: THROUGHOUT GNC SUBSYSTEM
PART NUMBER:
C [NA ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. ONLY USED TO MONITOR CIRCUITS, NOT REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE
OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 3/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: GNC FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1954 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MEASUREMENT ISOLATION RESISTORS
FAILURE MODE: OPENS, OUT OF TOLERANCE, SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST : LES DRAPELA SUBSYS LEAD: LES DRAPELA
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) GNC
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
THROUGHOUT GNC SUBSYSTEM
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. ONLY USED TO MONITOR CIRCUITS, NOT REQUIRED FOR VEHICLE
OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/02/88 E-II

APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
None.
F-I
APPENDIXF
,'n' _ ? prrp_c,,_rprCOMMCNnATIONeNASA FMEA Tn ]OA WuRKSHcE_CROSS J
05-01-(I0),PRELREF
05-i-(09),PREL REF
, '}5-I-<TB002)
05-i- _TB_'03)
05-!-(TBD04)
05-I-(TBD05)
05-1-(TBDO!}
05-I-FCI042-!
_.5-1-FC2042-I
05-i-FC2042-2
')5-i-FO3042-I
05-1-FC_042-2
05-i-FC_042-3
05-I-FC_!42-1
05-I-FC3142-3
05-I-FC3242-I
05-I-FC3242-2
05d-FC3242-3
05-I-FC3442-I
-&- _ ? ,I ,-_V,J-,FC.>44._-._
C'5-I-FC3442-3
OJ-_-FC6O4--I
05-I-FC6042-2
OJ-i-FC6._4_-I
0_-I-FC_4--,
05-I-FC6342-!
05-[-FC6_42-2
05-I-FC6542-I
O_'-!-FC6J4,-_,
"JS-!-FC7241-000!
• c 9n _ C "lO_-I-FC_4_-OUO_
05-I-FC7244-0001
05-!-FC7244-0002
05-I-FC7245-0001
SNC-960
GNC-961
GNC-951
GNC-SSO
GNC-!580 ,,
GNC-_586A _I
GNC-15B6B II
GNC-156]B _
GNC-1576 II
GNC-gOl
GNC-SO2
GNC-_001
GNC-!002
GNC-!0!
_NC-!02
GNC-!04
_NC-!O_ "
_NC-105
GNC-202
GNC-20I
GNC-2D3
GNC-401
GNC-402
SNC-403
SNC-406X
GNC-301
GNC-302
GNC-304
GNC-1103
GE-1104
SNC-!20!
GNC-!206
@NC-1203
SNC-1205
SNC-I303
GNC-!304 II
GNC-120 :I
_NC-I_O I_
GNC-[41 II
SNC-IIIO I;
GNC-1111 II
GNC-!111A It
GNC-160 II
I NASA i; IOA RECOMMENDATIONSI
_--. I I ................................................
I CRIT I SCREENS II CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER ISSUE
I HW/F I A B C IIHW/F I A 8 C I (SEELEGENDCODE)
/
,!
'_XlR
_/IR
•")/0
3/2_
J;J
9;._
_,'d
"31")
31!R
2/IR
_'/IR
2/IR
I/I
_;_!R
3/IR
3/IR
_IR
3!IR
3/IR
211R
311R
3/IR
2/IR
3ilR
3/IR
I/I
2/IR
3I!R
21IR
I/I
_/IR
;/I
2/IR
3/IR
3,,'_
3/,3
3/IR
3/'R
3/IR
3;_,
P F P
P P P
_A NA NA
P P P
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
P P P
P F P
P P P
P F P
NA NA NA
P F' P
P P F'
F' P F'
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
NA NA NA
P F P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P F P
P P P
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA HA
F P P
F P P
F P P
NA NA NA
'I I
i i !
it "
,i
/
II /
II i
II /
II !
II /
II i
II /
/
311R
3/IR
311R
I/I
NA NA NA
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
NA NA NA
===================================_======================================================_=======_=====_=====_==
F-2
IDENTIFIERS II NASA il IOARECOMMENDATIONSi
..........................................II ..............II ...............................................
NASA IDA ,. CRIT I SCREENS IICRIT I _C._EN. , OTHER i==_:
FMEA NUMBER ASSESSMENTNUMBERIIHW/F i A B C IIHW/F I A B C I :SEELEGENDCODE}
'===...................:====............===II..................i_ ......I..........'====.................:.......
GNC-161 II 3/3 NA NA NA II 3/IR P P P05-I-FC7245-0001
05-I-FC_4u-O00_
05-I-FC7246-000!
05-I-FC7246-0002
05-L-FC7248-O001
05-I-FC724B-O002
05-I-FC7249-0001
05-I-FC7250-0001
05-I-FC725!-0001
05-!-FC725!-0002
•_-.-_C,.,;-.:.n
05-I-FC7253-000!
05-!-FC7254-!
05-i-FC7255-I
05-I-FC725_-I
05-I-FC7257-0001
fiR- - 7 _' - _i'I
.._[ FC,_u8U.Ol
05-!-FC7259-0001
05-I-FC7260-0001
GNC-!60D
GNC-160A
GNC-161A
oNu-,60E
GNC-ISOB
GNC-161B
GNC-160F
_NC-160C
,3NC-i61C
GI_C-I_OG
GNC-1601
GNC-1602
GNC-410
GNC-411
GNC-410A
GNC-1400
GNC-1401
GNC-!404
GNC-1402
_HC-[!O:
GNC-140:A
GNC-!_O
GNC-131
GNC-!30A
GNC-131A
GNC-130B
,-.Nu-lolB
GNC-!501
GNC-1502
, GHC-1570
GNC-1510
GNC-15!I
GNC-1515
GNC-151_
GNC-1575
GNC-1577
GNC-1520
GNC-1521
GNC-1560
8NC-!56!
GNC-1586
GNC-1530
• ot,I_-lu_u
GNC-1536
GNC-1540
' GNC-154i
GNC-1545
GNC-1546
GNC-!550
II
II
II
II
II
05-I-FC7261-0001
3/3
3/:,
,Jt .J
•3/:
J /2
3/:
.3/3
:/3
_/S
:/3
::/3
:/3
,Q/ J.
3/:
.!/ .J
31_
_/:
:/_
3!5
I', 3/3
-D_ ,J
' ' 31:
_, J/J
)
Jr,)
•3/:
:I3
35]
3/3
NA NA HA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA HA
NA HA NA
NA NA NA
NA HA NA
NA NA NA
!_A_A NA
.......A HA
NANA NA
HA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA _A NA
NA _A NA
_A NA HA
NA NA NA
NA _A _A
NA _A NA
NA NA NA
NA NA HA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
HA HA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
HA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NANA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NANA NA
NA NA NA
NA _iANA
NA NA NA
NA NA UA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NANA NA
NA NA NA
!_ANA NA
If o/tR P P P
" 3/IR P P :'
,",,3/IR P P ,_'
,", 3/IR P P O
,, Iyl P p p
,," _!IR ,P P P
-t
" .,!IR P P P
',I 3/IR P P F
! i 21 i?.....
',_ "_# ! 7,' P P P
7
1
I
#
s
:'"R " P PJ/ i, _ ,
3/IF:, P F' P ',
3/!R)P P P I
?,,'IR i P P P ,'
,, :,"!R I F P P ,
i
/
s'
i
/
i
3/2R P F' P
3/2R P P P
312R P P P
3/2R P F' F'
:.,"2RP F' P
3i2R P P P
3/2P. P P F'
:,"2R F' P P
.,,.,r, p p p
:/2R P F' P
.,,'._R P P P
_,_R P P P
2y2 NA NA NA
" 3/2R P P P
7 _ p',',;,' R F' P
, , _;_R P P P
)i 3/2R F' P P
)i :/2R F' P F'
i _ "3' ,nl_, O
,, ;,'=,, , P F'
,, 3/2R P P P
,," .3/2R P P ?
'_
F-3
IDENTIFIERS ,," NASA ,," IDARECDMMENDATIONS
,._. _ IDA ,,'_CRIr ; :_a==NS 11CRIT i SCREENS I OTHER i :ccu:
FMEA_IUMBER ....c_'P_? _
. H_._==n._,NUMBERI!HW!F i A B C IIHW/F I A _ _ i :SEELEE_!DCDE)
' ' II I ..................
05-I-FC7261-0001 ....I_= ?/2R ' _'
O5-I-FC7261-OOOIA
05-!-GN21-!
05-I-_N21-2
05-:-_N22-i
_=-i-S_i22-2
05-I-GN22-:
05-I-GN2B-1
05-6-200400-I
vd-O-£_.d,-I
:15-6-265_-2
_,=,r ,,H_ O_EL REF
_5-_0-(0S}.PREL REF
05-60-(04)PREL REF
05-60-(051PREL REF
05-60-(06)PREL REF
05-60-(07}PREL REF
05-60-(08}PBELREF
05-60-(09)PREL REF
05-60-i10)PRELREF
05-60-(11)PREL REF
05-_0-(12) PRELREF
05-60-(13}PREL REF
05-60-(I_)PRELREF
05-_0-i15)PREL REF
05-60-(16},PRELREF
05-60-(_7),PREL REF
05-60-(18),PRELREF
05-60-02,PRELREF N
05-60-200[00-I
GNC-15BI
GNC-15B2
GNC-1585
GNC-!53!
GNC-150
GNC-!51
GNC-502
GNC-50!
G!iC-_OI
GNC-604X
GNC-6OIA
GNC-B02
GNC-801
GNC-IBO!A
GNC-1802A
GNC-IBO:A
GNC-!BO4A
GNC-1802
G_C-!B04
GNC-IBO_
SNC-:5!X
GNC-!Oi2
BNC-1012A
8NC-IOI2B
GNC-IIIIB
GNC-13IOB
GNC-IIlIC
GNC-1953X
GNC-1310C
GNC-I310D
GNC-I310E
GNC-II!2
GNC-11:OC
GNC-!I:OD
GNC-I!30E
GNC-I952X
oNu-l%vX
GNC-611
SNC-612
GNC-51!
GNC-SI2
_C-5!0
_o n(i
GNC-1014X
GNC-!:IO
GNC-!:!OA
05-60-200200-:
_5-60-200200-2
05-_0-200:01-I
05-60-200501-I
05-_0-200601-I
C'5-60-200_02-I
' ' 3!:
" _/.3
,J/ J
,_,:3
3/3
:3/3
:/IR
2/IR
3/iR
-,'IF:
" :/IR
.3/!R
3/IR
_/IR
3/IR
2/!R
-', i ! p
2: IP.
2/IR
S,,iR
.3/:
S/IR
:; LR
:/3
3/3
" 2:IR
" :/IR
',1 31.3
i :/!R
:/!R
', 3/3
, _,'!R
, :/!R
_ 3/s
, 3,"iR
3_R
,' 3/:R
.:./
NA NA NA I',
NA NA NA t t
NA !_ANA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
P P F
P P F
, F' P P
P F _ !
P P P
P P P
P P P
P P P
P NAP
P F_AF
F' _A:'
P NA P
P F F
P F F
!_A_<ANA
!_A_,_ANA
NA NA NA
P P P
P P P
P P P
p p p '.',
NA NA '_A_i
NA NA NA '_:
NA NA NA il
P FP ',i
P F P ',',
P P P
NA NA t_A I
P F F' ',
P F P ',
NA NA NA i
P P P
NA MA NA I
NA NA NA i
p p p ',
P P P ;
P P P I
P F P
P F P '
F' F P
P F P
r4A_A _A
3/2R t P P P
2/2 : NA NA NA
2/2 I NA NA NA
3i2R _ P P P
/
/
/
/
/
J
/
/
/
/
/
2/!R NA RA RA
2/IR P P P :-
/
/ I
I/i NA NA _A :
2/!R i P P P i
F-4
.... r ..... " " " _,_r_,_p.'InAT" r
......................................... ii .............. {{
..... T 'SCREENS ' ''_--NASA _ IOA I:CRIT ',SCREENS i'_.n_, , I OTHER , L=_"P
FMEA NUMBER ',ASSESSMENTNUMBER',',H_/F I A B C I',HW/F ] A B C ', (SEELErjENDCODE) i
c.... c,c,'7_ ...... _./!R _' F F' ",,_ 60 _..':_'0.-- _NC-I_v .... "
05-60-200707.,-I _,.._-:_r-'.._,,_'.naZ/3 NA NA NA ,," /
05-60-2t_0706=I GNC-i!.30B 3/3 NA NA )_A'.I /
C5-60-2{'0800-000! GNC-[590 "J/3 I4ANA NA II /
GNC-t593 _/l] NA NA NA 3/IR P P P
.,,=_ -__p1(_oo_,",_ _/lP P ,'v_ 6(;.C.._ uO..1 GNC-9C,5 , .. P P
05-60-FC!043-0001 GNC-90Z _/IR P P P /
05-60-FC1044-0001 GNc-gc'4A Z,"IR P P P '
_,__c___r_-;_,__'v'_i'{_, _NC__,'.,|I_ "*, .... o r,
I",_-ArI-RX:f'_:_hI-_ GNC-810 ""_' P P P '
GNC-811 3ilR P P P /
05-60-6N0802-! GHC-BI2 3/3 NA NA I,IA /
05-60-1MU(OZ) GNC-510A 3/1R P P P /
05-60-IMU(05) GNC-!954X 3/Z NA NA HA /
05-$0-!MU(04) .....'_'
,,=o _,c_ , GNC-11' _' 3/IR F' _ _'jj-_-xi VJ-i • , ? /
05-6Q-2203-(TBD)PRE GNC-!!IB 2/2 P P P /
05-6Q-220Z-I GNC-!IIA 2_IR, c,,,P p, ,, ,,
05-6Q-220:Z-2 =rNc-110 3/3 NA HA '_A /
05-67-2020!)0-I 5!4C-7!! 3/IR P P P
¢hU-:_ Z/IR P P P /
O:-_-;_lOl-I GNC-703X 3/IR P P P /
"..... ,(" " _t.'C-Vnl JIR P _ F'
'4ONE GNC-!01_, :;,.Z- NA HA NA
GNC-t!OI ,", 3/tR ,P P P
GNC-[I02 ',I _/IR P P P
GNC-!IO5 _,.... ,, Z/IR P F' P
GNC-II06 ',l ',l _/IR P P P
GNC-I!07 ',I ,",.5/IR .c'p ,P
r.NC-t,,',8... ,," ',_.3/IR ,P ,P .P
GNC-tlZI ',', ',',_;_ NA NA _'^MH
ohu-1"07 ,, ,, ..,,'t,, P r c',
GNC-120B Ii Z/IR _ P P
GNC-1211 ',t 3/'3 NA NA NA
_NC-t=I,_ ', _,',) NA NA NA
GNC-1214 I /
GNC-!301 " _,'IR P P P
'_'_ 3/[R _ P PbNC-ioO_
c" , ,GNC-I.,O_ 3/IF: R o p
GNC-!311 Z/Z tiANA _4A
GNC-[9(_I 3/!R P P P
3NC-1902 Z/IR, P P F' ;
,F R rGNC-30Z 3/IR ....
G t,, _Nu-_04 / :
G.NC-405 ,' '
Gt4C-602 3/IR '.P P P
GNC-610 _,z.3 I !4ANA NA
F-5
F-6


